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Lock-Up Creep
Steven M. Davidoff*
Christina M. Sautter*
ABSTRACT

In recent years, the number and type of merger agreement lock-ups have
significantly increased,aphenomenon we term "lock-up creep". Not only have new lockups arisen, but the terms of these lock-ups have become ever-more negotiated, intricate,
and varied This Article analyzes the causes of lock-up creep and assesses lock-up
creep's effect on the takeover market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If you have regularly read merger agreements over the past decade, you may have
had a creeping feeling. The number and type of merger agreement lock-ups have
materially increased, a phenomenon that this Article terms "lock-up creep." Not only
have new lock-ups arisen, but the terms of these lock-ups have become more varied as
attorneys negotiate ever-more intricate terms. The result is that the provisions of merger
agreements addressing lock-ups now go on for multiple pages and are the main focus of
attorney negotiations.
Lock-ups are contractual devices that buyers and sellers negotiate in an acquisition
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agreement. A lock-up theoretically compensates a buyer for its investment costs in
making an initial bid for a target by making a second, competing bid more costly. The
theory is that without such compensation, an initial bidder would be unwilling to expend
its resources to bid, knowing that others might free-ride on the initial bidder's efforts. But
while academics generally agree on the theory that lock-ups can be incentivizing, there
has been a continuing, unresolved debate over whether lock-ups can be preclusive and
otherwise destroy wealth and deter bids.I
Lock-ups are also ubiquitous in merger agreements. Common types of lock-ups
include termination fees and shareholder voting agreements.2 However, there are other
types of lock-ups, such as a crown jewel lock-up, which permits a buyer to purchase a
key asset of the target upon the target accepting another bid.3 Lock-ups existed in many
forms for decades, but in recent years, new lock-ups have appeared or been widely
adopted, such as matching rights, which give a bidder the right to match a competing
offer,4 as well as don't ask, don't waive standstills, which prevent losing bidders from
making a competing bid or even requesting that a target waive such a requirement. The

1. The literature on this issue is thick and varies in its conclusions. See inter-alia Shmuel Leshem, A
Signaling Theory of Lock-ups, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (2012); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection
Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003); John C. Coates, IV & Guhan
Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 (2000); Kermit
Roosevelt III, UnderstandingLock-ups: Effects in Bankruptcy and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 17 YALE
J. REG. 93 (2000); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance DamagesApproach to CorporateLockups, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 564 (1995); Steven M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated
Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1994); Stephen Fraidin & Jon Hansen, Toward Unlocking Lock-ups, 103
YALE L. J. 1739 (1994); Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lockups: Do Target Treasury Sales Forecloseor Facilitate
Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 682 (1990); Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, CorporateMergers:
Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1987). See generally Alan Schwartz, Search
Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J. L. & ECON. ORG. 229, 238 (1986) (discussing auction theory and its
application to the sale of the firm).
2. For a review of the various types of lock-ups, see generally MERGER & ACQUISITIONS COMM., ABA,
MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF APUBLIC COMPANY (2011) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
MERGER AGREEMENT].
3. See Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES
AND DIVISIONS 111 (2000). See also Robert W. Rodriguez, Hostile Takeover Contests: The Rise and Fall of
Lock-up Options, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 193, 200 (1987).
4. This is a narrow definition of matching rights. Others have given it a broader scope to include
information rights and notice requirements. Brian JM Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standardof Review
for Matching Rights in Control Transactions,36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1015 (2011).
5. See Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control
Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 987-92 (2013) [hereinafter Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken?]
(postulating how Delaware courts are likely to treat don't ask, don't waive standstills); Christina M. Sautter,
Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a Sale of CorporateControl, CASE W. RES.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 75-79), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2207693 (applying
auction theory to don't ask, don't waive standstills, and arguing such standstills may aid in shareholder wealth
maximization); Quinn, supra note 4, at 1015-18 (describing the emergence, scope, and use of matching rights).
See also Diane Holt Frankle, Don't Ask, Don't Waive After Ancestry.com, KAYE SCHOLER M&A AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NEWSLETTER (Winter 2013), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/client alerts/MAand-Corporate-Govemance-Newsletter-Winter2013/ res/id=saFilel/MACGN-Winter2Ol3.pdf (discussing the
role of don't ask, don't waive provisions in merger agreements).

2013]

Lock- Up Creep

683

end result is that merger agreements contain increasingly scripted procedures for how and
when a board should deal with competing bids.
Attorneys for buyers and targets are also negotiating increasingly intricate lock-ups.
For example, information rights can require that the target provide the buyer all oral and
6
written communications received, any written communications, or any written offers.
Matching rights have rapidly evolved into reset matching rights that apply each time a
competing bid is made, single-trigger matching rights that give an initial bidder only one
right to match a bid, or something in-between. 7 Provisions concerning recommendation
changes now are often bifurcated to address competing bids, as well as so-called
intervening events, which are unexpected occurrences that may require the target board to
reconsider their recommendation in favor of a transaction.
What is the consequence of lock-up creep? Definitive conclusions are difficult
because of an identification problem. More specifically, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to isolate the influence or wealth effects of individual lock-ups. 9 Nonetheless, in the past
decade neither bid rates nor premiums appear to have changed significantly.10 This and
other evidence indicates that lock-up creep has had little aggregate effect on the
acquisition market. However, despite the lack of evidence of aggregate market effect,
there are some clear examples where lock-up creep, and individual lock-ups, have
influenced the outcome of individual transactions.
We, ironically enough, attribute lock-up creep to events following the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,Inc., a case which was
thought at the time to require more enhanced scrutiny of lock-ups.12 The Delaware Court
of Chancery in a series of cases after Omnicare and perhaps in response, adopted
deferential standards of scrutiny for lock-ups. To be sure certain types of preclusive lockups remained per se invalid, but beyond these confined categories, these decisions
13
opened up space for lock-up creep to occur.
While the Delaware courts cleared the way for lock-up creep, its causes can be
attributed to perhaps over-lapping explanations. The first explanation is that lock-up
creep is simply the evolution of merger agreements in response to market forces. More

6. For a discussion of the difference, see In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL,
2011 WL 6382523, at *21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011).
7. See Quinn, supra note 4, at 1015-18 (discussing the various types of matching rights in merger
agreements). See also Guhan Subramanian, Matching Rights: A Boon to Both Sides, HARvARD Bus. REv. (Dec.
1,2005).
8. See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supranote 2, § 4.6, 470-71.
9. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this issue.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
12. Sean J. Griffith, The OmnipresentSpecter of Omnicare, 39 J. Corp. L. 753, 759 (2013).
13. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL
1054255, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) ("No-talk provisions ... are troubling precisely because they prevent a
board from meeting its duty to make an informed judgment with respect to even considering whether to
negotiate with a third party."); Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 109 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that a
no-talk provision in the merger agreement at-hand was of "quite dubious validity" and citing Phelps Dodge).
Since these cases, practitioners have categorically avoided no-talks.
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specifically, lock-up creep is a response to a changing market and the requirement that
initial bidders be compensated to a greater amount for their bidding costs. Second, lockup creep may be attributable to sell-side agency costs in the form of management taking
advantage of these shifts to rent seek and create more entrenching lock-ups. Finally, lockup creep may be a consequence of agency costs on the buy-side. Attorneys, looking to
show value to clients, have been negotiating increasingly new and byzantine lock-ups.14
We believe that we are the first to point to these attorney agency costs as driving lock-up
negotiations.
We examine the various explanations for lock-up creep and are unable to make a
definitive conclusion as to its cause. We do find that market forces may act in certain
circumstances to influence the scope and effect of lock-ups in individual cases.
Nonetheless, given the weight of the evidence, we do conclude that lock-up creep appears
to be more likely a result of attorney transaction costs.
The limited evidence leads to two conclusions. First is the less than satisfying one
that we need more empirical study of lock-up creep to ascertain its effects. However, this
may be difficult due to identification issues. Second is how the Delaware courts should
deal with lock-up creep. Given the evidence and uncertainty, we do not recommend a
holistic remedy. Instead, we modestly suggest that in light of lock-up creep, Delaware
courts should analyze the effect of lock-ups more broadly rather than continuing their
prior focus on only a few types of lock-ups. This review appears particularly appropriate
in situations where it is likely to make a difference, namely competitive bidding
situations.
Part I of this Article briefly explores and identifies the issue of lock-up creep. Part II
examines lock-up creep's effect on the takeover market. Part III identifies possible causes
and the Delaware courts' shifting doctrinal approach to lock-ups, and Part IV concludes
with recommendations for the courts.
II. IDENTIFYING LOCK-UP CREEP
An apt illustration of lock-up creep and its many facets can be found by comparing
the agreement for Yahoo's $3.6 billion acquisition of GeoCities in 1999, to the agreement
for Oracle's $1.9 billion acquisition of Taleo in 2012, excerpts of which are set forth at
Appendix A. Yahoo's agreement spends 1,874 words detailing its transaction lock-ups, or
more specifically, the procedures the GeoCities board is to follow if a competing bid is
made or proposed. The Yahoo-ieoCities acquisition agreement contains a no-solicit, a
no-talk, a fiduciary-out applicable in cases of a superior proposal, information rights, and
a termination fee set at 2.8% of the transaction value. Typical of the time, the
transaction also included a stock option agreement permitting Yahoo to buy up to 19.99%

14. See Claire A. Hill, Why ContractsAre Written in "Legalese", 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 70-73 (2002)
(discussing the incentives and drivers of attorneys in negotiating complex contracts). See also Steven M.
Davidoff, The FailureofPrivateEquity, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 518-22 (2009) (discussing the incentives and
drivers of attorneys negotiating private equity acquisition contracts).
15. GeoCities, Agreements and Plan of Merger By and Among Yahoo! Inc. Home Page Acquisition Corp.
and GeoCities (Preliminary Schedule 14A), § 5.4, A-27 (Jan. 27, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1062777/0001047469-99-007461.txt.
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of GeoCities stock in circumstances where GeoCities terminated the agreement to accept
a competing transaction. 16
In comparison, the Oracle-Taleo acquisition agreement uses 3,993 words to set forth
the parties' agreed lock-ups.17 The agreement contains the same lock-ups as the YahooGeoCities deal, except for the stock o ion, but these lock-ups have also changed to
become more extensive and detailed. The no-solicitation clause now includes a
fiduciary-out, which limits waivers of standstill rights and requires that any competing
bidder execute a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to Taleo than the one with
Oracle.19 Oracle's information rights also require Taleo to provide Oracle with all
information provided to a third party bidder whether it is transmitted in written or oral
form.20 In addition, the termination fee is set at 3.46% of the transaction value, higher
than the termination fee in Yahoo-Geocities. 21 Not only are the lock-ups more complex,
but there are new lock-ups which do not appear in the Yahoo-GeoCities agreement. This
includes a non-waiver requirement for Delaware's anti-takeover statute, reset matching
rights, information parity rights, intervening event requirements, and a reaffirmation
requirement.22 There is also a voting agreement for the company's major stockholders,
officers, and directors. 23
The Oracle-Taleo acquisition agreement is not atypical and contains lock-ups that
are quite common in today's acquisition agreements. Factset Mergermetrics tracks
16. Id. § 5.14, A-31. The Yahoo-GeoCities transaction was a stock-for-stock one, so it arguably was
subject to lower review standards. However, the agreement was standard at the time for transactions also subject
to the so-called Unocal standard. See Viacom Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Between Viacom Inc. and
CBS Corp. (Form S-4), § 6.05, 40-41 (Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/813828/000094018099001184/0000940180-99-001184.txt (using 1,115 words to describe
lock-ups which include a no-talk, no-solicit, information rights, fiduciary out for recommendation change and
force-the-vote).
17. Taleo Corp., Agreement and Plan of Merger Dated as of February 8, 2012 Among Taleo Corp., OC
Acquisition LLC, Tiger Acquisition Corp., and Oracle Corp., § 6.03, 40-41 (Feb. 8, 2012), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 134203/000119312512049576/d298155dex2 1.htm.
Taleo-Oracle Merger Agreement].
18. Stock options like the one in Yahoo/GeoCities are no longer widely utilized due to changes in
accounting rules. At the time of the Yahoo/Geocities deal, the exercise of this option would arguably eliminate
the ability of a subsequent bidder to use pooling accounting. Pooling accounting treatment was eliminated as of
June 30, 2001, limiting the effectiveness of the option. See Say Goodbye to Pooling and Goodwill
Amortization,
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Sep/SayGoodByeToPoolingAndGoodwillAmortization.htm
(As of June 30, 2001, . . . [c]ompanies no longer may use the pooling-of-interests accounting method for
business combinations).
19. Taleo-Oracle Merger Agreement, § 6.03(b), 40.
20. Id. § 9.04, 53-54.
21. Id. § 6.03, 40-41.
22. Id..
23. See generally Taleo-Oracle Merger Agreement, § 6.03, 40-41.
24. We do not distinguish here between lock-ups in change of control transactions which are generally
subject to heightened review under Revlon and all-stock transactions which are generally only subject to Unocal
review. Moreover, as we discuss in Part IV.A., supra, the Chancery Court does not seem to distinguish between
the Revlon or Unocal standards in reviewing lock-ups. The overwhelming majority of Delaware cases we
discuss in Part IV and summarize in Appendix B are change of control transactions subject to Revlon. Of the
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these provisions for data collection purposes and currently has 25 different categories of
lock-ups.25 The ABA model public acquisition agreement's section on lock-ups goes on
for 37 pages to explain the various forms and types of lock-ups. It includes over 30
different types of lock-ups.27
As the Oracle-Taleo agreement shows, it is not just that parties are using the same
lock-ups as a decade ago. In recent years, there has been the introduction of a number of
new types of lock-ups, the most prominent example being that of matching rights.
Matching rights first appeared in transactions in the early part of the new millennium.
However, as Chart L.A shows, their use increased substantially over the past decade. 28

Chart I.A.: % of Transactions with
Matching Rights
100%

/

80%
60%

40%
20%
0%

2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

2012

Source: MERGERMETRICS DATABASE

Today, matching rights are nearly ubiquitous and in 2012 were utilized in 96% of
transactions.29 The rise of matching rights also illustrates a second phenomenon of lockup creep: the increasingly heterogeneous nature of lock-ups. In the case of matching
rights, there is no single formulation that predominates. The period during which

cases summarized in Appendix B, only three did not involve change of control transactions (In re Synthes, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012); Louisiana Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918
A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007); and Orman v. Cullman, No. Civ.A. 18039 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch.
2004)).
25. See FACTSET MERGERS, http://www.mergennetrics.com/ (last visited July 12, 2013) [hereinafter
MERGERMETRICS DATABASE].

26. See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 4.4, 4.6, 148-65, 169-89.
27. Id.
28. By 2005, in In re Toys "R" Us S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005), then-Vice
Chancellor Strine remarked that they were "a common contractual feature."
29.

MERGERMETRICS DATABASE, supra note 25.
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matching rights can be exercised varies from transaction to transaction, being anywhere
from one to ten days, or longer.30 Matching rights also can be single-trigger matching
rights, which can only be used once or once on each competing bid. 3 ' Matching rights
can be in the form of reset matching rights, which can be used repeatedly no matter how
many times a competing bidder raises its offer. 32 A third variant eliminates matching
rights beyond one time if the buyer bids above a certain threshold amount.33
While matching rights are the most prominent, new example, other recently
introduced lock-ups include ask, don't tell standstills and the so-called Burger King
structure, which involves a dual tender offer-merger process in order to ensure the
transaction closes as quickly as possible. 34
In the world of mergers and acquisitions, where legal practice is concentrated and
market-based, these new innovations spread rapidly. For example, in recent years
transactional attorneys have created new and varied fiduciary-out provisions, the contract
terms which govern when the board can recommend another, competing offer or
otherwise terminate the agreement. Chart I.B sets forth the differing types of "outs" in
acquisition agreements from 2004-2011 and their evolution (as gathered from the
American Bar Association's Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal
Points Studies)35
30. Quinn, supra note 4, at 1050-52.
31. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among Denali Holding Inc., Denali Intermediate Inc.,
Denali Acquiror Inc., and Dell Inc., at 45 (Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/826083/000119312513041273/d480506dex2 1.htm.
32. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among Dell Inc., Dell Trinity Holdings Corp. and
at 62 (Aug.
15,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
3Par Inc.,
1408501/000119312510189426/dex21.htm.
33. See Agreement and Plan of Merger among Ivy Holdings Inc., Ivy Merger Sub Corp. and Prospect
Medical Holdings, Inc., at 44 (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1063561/000095012310077684/v57052exv2wl.htm. See also Steven M. Davidoff, How Innovations
Spread in Deal-Making, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2010, 10:00 AM), available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/how-innovations-spread-in-deal-making (describing an agreement
providing that ifjumping bidder topped by at least 10% then the matching right disappeared).
34. See generally Sautter, Promises Made To Be Broken?, supra note 5 (explaining standstills in depth);
Kirkland & Ellis Client Memo, Burger King Deal Structure Still Has Sizzle, (Oct. 10, 2012), available at
origination,
(detailing
the
http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentlD=230&itemld=10424
development, and use of the Burger King structure).
35. PowerPoint, Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the Mergers & Acquisitions Comm.
of the ABA Bus. Law Section, 2012 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study
(For TransactionsAnnounced in 2011), at 54, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL560003
[hereinafter 2012 Deal Points Study]; PowerPoint, Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the
Mergers & Acquisitions Comm. of the ABA Bus. Law Section, 2011 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers &
Acquisitions Deal Points Study (For Transactions Announced in 2010), at 55, http://apps.americanbar.org/
dch/committee.cfm?com-CL560003 [hereinafter 2011 Deal Points Study]; PowerPoint, Mergers &
Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the Mergers & Acquisitions Comm. of the ABA Bus. Law Section,
2010 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions DealPoints Study (ForTransactionsAnnounced in
2009), at 59, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com-CL560003 [hereinafter 2010 Deal Points
Study]; PowerPoint, Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the Mergers & Acquisitions Comm.
of the ABA Bus. Law Section, 2009 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study
(For Transactions Announced in 2008), at 59 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
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Chart I.B. Fiduciary-Out Provisions in Merger Agreements
If Fiduciary Duties Require
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Source:Datafrom ABA's
2012,2009,2008,and2007Strategic Buyer/Public TargetMergers& Acquisitions DealPoints Studies.The2007 Studyincluded data for
both 2006and200aswellas a coparisonto2004data.

In summarizing the 2004 data, the American Bar Association divided the
recommendation out into two standards: a board could terminate an agreement or
recommend an offer only for a superior offer or for something other than a superior offer
(generally this is understood to be the same as when a board's fiduciary duties required
such a recommendation change).36 In 2004, 59% of agreements contained the fiduciary
duties standard,37 a number which fell to 22% by 2011.38 Similarly, 41% of agreements
in 2004 had a superior offer only requirement,39 a number which fell to 14% by 2011.40
In its place, three other standards have arisen, and the most common approach now, at
34% of transactions, up from 8% in 2008, is to require boards to separate% take into
account competing bids and intervening events involving other circumstances.
Termination fees or expense reimbursement provisions have also rapidly evolved
and become more costly in recent years. For example, Chart I.C. shows that over the
period from 2004 through 2011, there has been an increase in termination fees or expense
reimbursements that become payable upon a "naked no vote," or a rejection by
shareholders absent a competing offer.

corpgov/files/2009/10/Deal-Point-Study-9-10-09.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Deal Points Study]; PowerPoint,
Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the Comm. on Negotiated Acquisition the ABA Bus. Law
Section, 2008 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study (For Transactions
Announced in 2007),
at 51 (Nov.
13, 2008),
http://www.cooley.com/files/tbls28Resources/
FileUploadl78/1538/2008%2OPublic%20Company%/o2ODeal%2OPoint%/o2OStudy/o20-%20PPT.pdf [hereinafter
2008 Deal Points Study]; PowerPoint, Mergers & Acquisitions Market Trends Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Negotiated Acquisition the ABA Bus. Law Section, Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions
Deal Points Study (For Transactions Announced in 2005 and 2006), at 48 (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/files/2007/12/20071203-strategic-buyer-deal-points-study.pdf [hereinafter
2007 Deal Points Study] (also contains a comparison to 2004 data).
36. 2007 Deal Points Study, supranote 35.
37. Id.
38. 2012 Deal Points Study, supranote 35.
39. 2007 Deal Points Study, supranote 35.
40. 2012 Deal Points Study, supra note 35.
41. See 2009 Deal PointsStudy, supra note 35 (noting the data for 2008).
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Chart I.C.: Merger Agreements with Naked No-Vote Provisions and Circumstances
When Payable
Expense or Fee Thggered
No Expense or Fee Triggered
Expense Reimbursement Triggerec
Full Termination Fee Triggered
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87%
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Source: 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007 ABA
Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Studies. The2007 Study
Contains data for 2006, 2005, and 2004.

In 2011, 29% of strategic transactions included a naked no vote fee or
reimbursement trigger,43 which was more than double and more than tri Ve the number of
transactions in 2004 and 2005/2006, respectively, with such a trigger. There has also
been a shift from naked no votes triggering expense reimbursement provisions to the full
agreement termination fee. In 2005 and 2006, a naked no vote triggered an expense
reimbursement in 94.4% of transactions and the full termination fee in only 5.6% of
transactions.45 Fast forward to 2011, and a naked no vote triggered an expense
reimbursement provision in only 75% of transactions, but a full termination fee in 25% of
transactions. 46 Naked no votes are not the only shift in termination fee triggers that have
occurred over the past few years. There has also been an increase in merger agreements
that trigger payment of the full termination fee after the target has received an alternative
acquisition proposal.47 In 2004, onlz 53%% of transactions included a termination fee
trigger for an acquisition proposal,4 but by 2011, 80% of transactions included such a

trigger. 49

It is not just new lock-ups and variants of existing ones that have rapidly spread. Old
lock-ups have been reinvented as well. As a recent client memo from the law firm
Kirkland & Ellis LLP aptly illustrates: "The 'crown jewel' lock-up, a staple of highstakes dealmaking technology in the 1980s takeover boom, has been showing some signs
of life in the contemporary deal landscape, albeit often in creative new forms." 50

42. 2012 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 62; 2011 Deal PointsStudy, supra note 35, at slide 62;
2010 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 66; 2009 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 66; 2008
Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 57; 2007 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 52. The
percentages appearing in the "Expense Reimbursement Triggered" and "Full Termination Fee Triggered"
categories were calculated by the authors based on the numbers provided on each slide.
43. 2012 DealPoints Study, supranote 35, at slide 62.
44. 2007 DealPoints Study, supra note 35, at slide 57.
45. Id.
46. 2012 Deal Points Study, supranote 35, at slide 62.
47. 2012 Deal PointsStudy, supra note 35, at slide 64; 2011 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 64;
2010 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 68; 2009 Deal Points Study, supra note 35, at slide 68; 2008
Deal Points Study, supranote 35, at slide 59; 2007 Deal Points Study, supranote 35, at slide 54.
48. 2007 Deal Points Study, supranote 35, at slide 54.
49. 2012 DealPoints Study, supranote 35, at slide 64.
50. Daniel E. Wolf et al., Kirkland M&A Update: Crown Jewels-Restoring the Luster to Creative Deal
Lock-ups?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.kirkland.com/files/MA Update/021413.pdf.
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The memo goes on to detail the recent use of crown jewel lock-ups in Apple's
acquisition of Authentec, ICE's acquisition of the NYSE, and the sale of Genomics.51
The client memo concludes that:
After a long period of dormancy, lock-ups"-"crown jewel" or otherwisehave seen a recent creative rebirth with some structural twists. What remains
clear is that, absent extreme circumstances (such as Bear Steams), an oldfashioned "crown jewel" asset lock-up that serves only to end an auction by
virtue of its preclusive impact on other bidders will be subject to significant
judicial scrutiny under basic Revlon and Unocal principles. However, a small
sampling of recent case law, coupled with developing market practice, suggest
that in appropriate circumstances there may be room in the dealmaking toolkit
for modem and creative variations on traditional lock-up arrangements (more
so where there is demonstrable business benefit to one or both parties beyond
the resulting deal protection). 52
The reinvention of old lock-ups reflects another aspect of lock-up creep also
illustrated in the Oracle-Taleo agreement, the increasing complexity and nuance of the
language used to define these lock-ups. A recent survey conducted by the law firm
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher illustrates this phenomenon. The law firm reviewed 59
acquisition agreements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2012,
representing the universe of transactions in that year with a value greater than $1
billion. 53 As part of this exercise the law firm tracked the different language used in each
lock-up and repeatedly found that significant lock-ups varied greatly in the language used
to define their parameters.54 For example, most of these agreements had a requirement
that a competing bidder could only be provided information if it signed an "acceptable"
confidentiality agreement. But as Chart I.D. shows, the language used to set forth this
requirement varied significantly:

5 1.
52.
53.
REPORT
54.

Id.
Id.
No-Shops & Fiduciary Outs: A Survey of 2012 Public Merger Agreements, GiBSON DUNN M&A
(Winter 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/MANewsletter-021913.pdf.
Id
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Chart I.D: Definition of Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement

Source: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher M&A Report,

nter 2013
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Similarly, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher also tracked the differing language used to set
forth the requirement for the fiduciary determination that a board must make before it can
change its recommendation. Again, the variation is significant:

Chart L.E: Fiduciary Determination Required Before Target Board
of Directors Can Change its Recommendation

"inconsistent with"
"reasonably likely" and "inconsistent with"
"reasonably likely" to be a breach
"reasonably" to be expected to breach
"would violate" or "would be a breach"
'required" or "necessary"
"reasonably" and "inconsistent with"
"more likely than not" to result in aviolation
"could be required"
"would be a breach" for superior proposals and
"reasonable" for intervening event
Suc:Gibson Dunn M&AReport, Winter 2012

27 (45.8o)

9(15.3%)

5(8.5%)
5(8.5%)

4(6.8%)
4 (6.8%)
2 (3.4%)

1(1.7%)

1(1.7%)

1(1.7%)
L

In both cases, it is questionable whether this differing language actually has any
actual legal consequence. In fact, there is no court case that we know of that has
addressed this differing language let alone explored the variation amongst it. In all
likelihood, a court, if it did address this, would simply view the language as more or less
saying the same thing.5
The consequence of the diversity in language, heterogeneity, and multiplicity of
lock-ups is that only a very small group of elite mergers and acquisitions lawyers can
understand these agreements and the nuance. But it also leaves a bigger question: what
are the consequences of lock-up creep?

55. This is essentially what has happened with the interpretation of the various forms of "efforts" that a
person or entity is sometimes required to undertake in a contract. See Kenneth A. Adams, Understanding "Best
Efforts" and Its Variants (IncludingDraftingRecommendations), 50 PRAC. LAW. 11, 14 (2004) ("The case law
on the meaning of best efforts suggests that instead of representing different standards, other efforts standards
mean the same thing as best efforts, unless a contract definition provides otherwise.").
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III. THE EFFECTS OF LOCK-UP CREEP
To assess the effects of lock-up creep, it is first necessary to understand its
theoretical underpinning. Lock-ups are designed to compensate bidders for their initial
bid. By offering to acquire the target, the initial bidder expends transaction-specific
resources in terms of due diligence and employee resources as well as lawyers and
investment bankers. The bidder also publicly reveals some of its private information
through informational spillover about the target, most notably the target's value. When
the bid is accepted and announced publicly, this information is provided to the market
where it may be used by other bidders who assign a higher value for the acquired
company. The other bidders can then bid using this information if the initial bid is lower
than that value.
This theoretical problem is exacerbated by Delaware's so-called Revlon doctrine,
which requires the board of directors of a target undergoing a change of control to obtain
the highest price reasonably available.56 A competing bidder can therefore bid after
public announcement of the first acquisition areement, and the target's board may be
obligated to accept it under the Revlon doctrine. If such a bid is made, the initial bidder
will be left with nothing but sunk costs. Thus, lock-ups are designed to encourage bidding
by compensating the initial bidder for making (and possibly losing) its bid. Without the
compensation lock-ups provide, there will theoretically be fewer bids, as bidders will be
hesitant to invest in making the first bid.58
There is evidence to support this theory. A study by Professor John C. Coates, IV
has found that there are more bids in the U.S. takeover market than the U.K. takeover
market. 59 U.K. bids also have more than double the chance of incurring competition. 60
They also have a lower rate of completion than U.S. bids.61 Professor Coates attributes
this development to the prohibition on lock-ups in the U.K. and the ability of competing

56. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("obtaining
the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director
action").
57. For a general review of this doctrine, see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN
TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION (2010).
58. See Coates & Subramanian, supranote 1, at 310-11. For a further discussion of the relevant auction
theory, see generally GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGOTIAUCTIONS: NEW DEALMAKING STRATEGIES FOR A
COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE (W. Norton & Company ed., 2010); Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in
Auction Design, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (2002); Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to
Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982); Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J.
Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982). See also Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 679-80 (2003) (utilizing
"negotiation-analytic tools to construct a model of bargaining in the 'shadow' of takeover defenses").
59. John C. Coates, IV, M&A Break Fees: US. Litigation vs. UK. Regulation, in REGULATION VERSUS
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 255, 262-63 (Daniel Kessler ed., Chicago University
Press, 2011).
60. Id. at 261-62.
61. Id.
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bidders to trump an initial bid without paying a penalty to the initial bidder.62 This
finding is in accord with auction theory that in many types of auctions, the greater
number of bidders, the higher the premium.63 In the U.K., there are likely more bidders
once a bid is announced because the costs of making a bid are lower.64 However, there
are also fewer bids since bidders in the U.K. are likely less willing to make an initial bid
without this compensation.65
Other empirical studies largely support the conclusions that lock-ups can affect the
bidding rate and premiums paid in takeovers. At least two studies examining the period
of the 1990s have found that bid premiums are higher in transactions with termination
fees paid by the target.66 At least one study has found similar results in examining stock
lock-ups.67 Another study by John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian found that the
size of the termination fee was correlated with the incidence of competition and that
higher premiums were "more likely with a stock lockup, or a larger stock lockup, but not
with breakup fees . .. 68

This can go too far, and if lock-ups are too onerous, some theorize they can prevent
second bids. In this scenario, lock-ups can be an agency cost management imposes in
order to ensure its chosen bidder succeeds. Even if the lock-ups are not preclusive, they
may individually or in the aggregate deter subsequent bidders from making a competing
bid. This could reallocate surplus to initial bidders away from shareholders or otherwise
place the firm in the hands of a bidder who is not willing to pay a higher value than
another bidder. The question of whether lock-ups can go too far is still debated among
academics where there is a sliding scale ranging from those who believe that lock-ups are
always acceptable to academics who take the contrary position that lock-ups can be

62. Id.
63. Klemperer, supranote 58.
64. Coates, supra note 59, at 245, 261.
65. Id. In either case, which regulatory scheme allocates maximum surplus to the target is subject to
debate. Id.
66. See Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. Lemmon, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do? An Analysis of
Termination Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 494 (2003) (observing that "bid
premiums are between 3.7% and 6.3% higher in deals that include target termination fees compared to deals
that do not"); Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 462
(2003) (observing that "takeover premiums are not lower when a target termination fee is included in the
merger terms and are potentially as much as 7% higher").
67. See Timothy R. Burch, Locking Out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in CorporateMergers,
60 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 124 (2007).
68. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 1, at 391. See also Jin Q. Jeon & James A. Ligon, How Much is
Reasonable? The Size of Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 959, 961 (2011)
(observing that competing bids are reduced in the case of higher termination fees paid by targets); Paul Andr6 et
al., Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: ProtectingInvestors or Managers?, J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT.
541, 543 (2007) (examining Canadian transactions and finding that "[r]elative termination fees are found to be
higher in transactions where the bidder incurs extensive merger costs, the deal includes a large cash component
and operating synergies are expected"); Audra Boone & Harold Mulherin, Do Termination Provisions Truncate
the Takeover Bidding Process?, 20 REv. FIN. STUD. 461, 484 (2007) (finding that termination fee size is
positively related to takeover competition).
69. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 238; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 120.
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preclusive.70
While the theorists debate, the empirical evidence points more to the reality that
lock-ups influence the takeover market. To the extent that this is correct, the stronger and
therefore more preclusive lock-ups are, the lower the bidding rate should be and the
higher the premiums paid. The number of jump bids should also adjust. Accordingly, if
markets are functioning efficiently, lock-up creep would increase the number of initial
bids, reduce the number of competitive bids, and decrease premiums (what we term the
"Lock-up Creep Hypothesis"). It would do so by increasing the cost of making a
competing bid, thereby also reducing post-announcement competing bids.
Reviewing the market data in the United States for the period from 2000 through
2012, the evidence provides mixed support for the Lock-up Creep Hypothesis. Chart II.A
sets forth the number and dollar value of U.S. completed takeover transactions with a
value of $100 million or greater over the time period from 2000 through 2012.

Chart II.A. Completed U.S. M&A
(Number & Value)
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Source: Dealogic
The number and value of transactions tend to track each other over time, and there
appears to be no secular trend in bid rates. The number of transactions peaked in 2000 at
531 with a value of $1.196 trillion. From 2002 through 2005, the number of deals

70. Compare Ayres, supra note 1, at 715 (concluding that lock-ups are not outcome determinative when
bidding competition exists); Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 1, at 1745 (concluding that lock-ups "like chicken
soup, can't hurt but may well help") with Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 1546 (concluding that lock-ups
can affect the motivations of second bidders to enter into competitive bidding); Coates & Subramanian, supra
note 1, at 313 (concluding that lock-ups can be foreclosing if sufficiently cost incurring).
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fluctuated from a low of 193 acquisitions with a value of $227 billion, to a high of 258
deals with a value of $540.7 billion. After peaking again in 2007, the numbers from 2009
through 2012 have roughly mirrored 2002 through 2005 levels, with the value of
transactions during this later time period being significantly higher, ranging from $370.9
billion in 2010 to $503.4 billion in 2011.
The rate of bids in mergers and acquisitions during this time period appears to be
more driven by extrinsic economic factors. It peaked during the internet bubble and again
in the years prior to the financial crisis, falling after each of these bubbles deflated. To
further explore the Lock-up Creep Hypothesis, Chart II.B sets forth the average initial
and final premiums in takeover transactions during the same time period.

Chart II.B: Average Premiums in
Public M&A Transactions
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Final Premium in Public M&A Transactions

-Average

Initial Premium in Public M&A Transactions

Source: Dealogic (for completed transactions with a value greater than 100MM)
Over the twelve-year period, final premiums paid dip in the period prior to the
financial crisis but then begin to rise towards pre-2003 levels. Theoretically, lock-up
creep should reduce ultimate premiums paid by lowering the rate of competing bids. But
the lack of a meaningful change in premiums does not provide evidence in support of the
Lock-up Creep Hypothesis. 7 Additionally, if markets are functioning efficiently, targets
may demand higher initial premiums to compensate them for the reduced likelihood of
competing bids keeping average premiums constant. Chart II.B does show some
convergence in 2010 through 2012 with initial and final premiums paid having less than a
1% difference compared to 2009 where the difference is almost 3%. However, even in
earlier times, there is similar convergence, such as during the period from 2001 to 2002
and 2004 through 2007. If Lock-up Creep were having an effect on initial premiums paid,

71. While the trend line over the period for final merger premiums is down, this appears to be driven by
the financial crisis given the upswing in premiums to prior levels after that period.
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it would be expected that there would be a more constant convergence than is present in
the descriptive statistics.
We next further explore the issue of competing bids and premiums over time. Chart
II.C sets forth descriptive statistics on the number and effect of bid jumps from the period
2003 through 2012. Bid jumps are announced transactions where a second competing bid
is made.

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

1
8
10
17
16
4
8
11
8
9
92

21.05%
18.36%
20.43%
11.90%
4.98%
8.33%
25.62%
25.57%
15.34%
21.64%
16.28%

0%
62.50%
70.00%
11.76%
56.25%
50.00%
75.00%
54.55%
50.00%
71.43%
51.11%

Source: Factset MergerMetrics

These numbers also provide mixed evidence for the Lock-up Creep Hypothesis,
which would predict fewer competing bids and declining bid success rates and higher
premiums paid for successful competing bids. While the number of bid jumps per year is
low, the number of competing bids peaks during the years before the financial crisis, but
is relatively flat from 2009 through 2012 and higher than in 2003 and 2004. Meanwhile,
the average change in shareholder value due to these competing bids appears to rise in
later years, while bidder success rates again fluctuate over the years without a
recognizable pattern.
Finally, in Chart II.D we examine whether changes in the way firms are sold may
have affected the type of lock-ups used. For example, if more firms are sold over time in
pre-announcement auctions, it may very well be that lock-up creep is justified and merely
reflects this market adjustment.

698

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 38:4

Chart lI.D.: % Completed U.S. M&A
w/Auction or Go-Shop
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The number of auctions rises from 2003 through 2007 and then largely fluctuates
between 30% and 40% starting in 2007. A similar pattern appears for transactions with
go-shops, which rise to 10% of all transactions by 2007 and then stays fairly constant.
The rise in auctions does support the market change story. In an auction scenario, buyers
may demand more lock-ups to join the bidding, something that may not be the case in a
negotiation, which typically involves only one bidder. Alternatively, though the lack of
sustained growth in sales via auction decreased from 2007, continued lock-up creep
mitigates against this determination. 72
While this evidence does not provide definitive support for the Lock-up Creep
Hypothesis, this is not to say that lock-ups have not influenced individual bidding
outcomes. Matching rights, for example, are repeatedly cited in individual cases for
affecting the course of bids. In the case of the sale of MySpace to News Corp., Viacom
executives claimed that Viacom refused to bid once News Corp. and MySpace executed a
merger agreement because Viacom executives thought the match right was preclusive,
foreclosing them from making a viable competing bid.7 3
The recent competitive bidding for 3Par and Diedrich Coffee also illustrates the
effect of matching rights on the course of bidding. In the case of 3Par, Dell originally
agreed to pay $18 per share to acquire the company and negotiated a reset match right
giving it three business days to match any competing bid. HP first bid $24, and in

72. Additionally, this data does not take into account the number of bidders in each auction, something
that would further determine whether lock-up creep was a result of market forces.
73. See JULIA ANGWIN, STEALING MYSPACE: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE MOST POPULAR WEBSITE IN
AMERICA 157-68 (2009) (describing the role of matching rights on Viacom's decision to bid for MySpace).
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response, Dell bid $24.30. HP then bid $27, and Dell matched it, also bidding $27. HP
then bid $33 per share, and Dell declined to bid. 74 By being able to bid in small
increments, or even match HP's bid exactly, Dell was able to ensure it did not pay any
more than its private value. Dell thereb' likely forced HP to push up its bidding much
higher than it might otherwise have bid. In the case of Diedrich Coffee, the competing
firms, Peet's Coffee & Tea Inc. ("Peet's") and Green Mountain Coffee Roasters Inc.
("Green Mountain"), conducted four rounds of competing bids with a similar pattern.
Peet's, the initial bidder, had reset matching rights and other notice provisions, which led
it to keep bidding-ultimately giving way when Green Mountain bid $36 against its
$32.50 bid.76 As with HP, Peet's raised its bid each time in small increments.
In these two cases, the competing bidder won multiple competitive rounds of
bidding, with matching rights permitting the initial bidders to set the bidding rounds and
bid no more than their private information allowed. It therefore pushed up the ultimate
price the competing bidder paid, while minimizing the risks to the initial bidder. This
could be beneficial in auctions where the parties have substantially differing values of the
target. In those circumstances, some theorists believe that this type of match right does
not deter bidding because each party is simply bidding their own value, thereby
transferring surplus to target shareholders. 77 The end result is that target shareholders will
receive a greater amount of surplus in these bids.
Professor Quinn also theorizes, though, that match rights can deter bids in other
circumstances. One case may be where bidders with equivalent values in a private value
auction may not want to incrementally bid.78 In the case of matching rights, the
determination of whether a bid is made because of this right is virtually impossible in
individual cases because non-bidders never inform the market of their reasons for not
bidding.79 Matching rights may also lead initial bidders to bid in lower amounts than they
otherwise would in a full blown auction where incremental bidding of this nature is not
permissible. The result may be lower prices generally for public shareholders.

74. Melly Alazraki, Hewlett-Packard,Dell Bidding War over 3Par Continues, DAILY FINANCE (Aug. 27,
2010, 10:28 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/08/27/3par-bidding-war-between-hp-dell-continues/;
Hugh Collins, Hewlett-Packardto Purchase 3Parfor $2.35 Billion, DAILY FINANCE (Sept. 3, 2010, 7:05 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/09/03/hewlett-packard-3par/.
75. Steven M. Davidoff, How Matching Rights Give Dell an Edge, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 26,
2010, 12:08 PM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/how-matching-rights-give-dell-an-edge/; Brian JM
Quinn, Match Rights and Incremental Bidding-3Par, M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2010/08/match-rights-and-incremental-bidding.html.
76. See Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Cease-Firein the Coffee War, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 9,
2009, 10:45 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/behind-the-cease-fire-in-the-coffee-war/.
77. Quinn, supra note 4, at 1013-14.
78. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., On the Right-of-First-Refusal, ADVANCES IN THEORETICAL EcoNs.,
Apr. 26, 2005, at 16, available at http://www.de gruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2005.5.1/ bejte.2005.5.1.1194/
bejte.2005.5.1.1194.xml.
79. The case of Viacom in the Myspace sale is a rare exception. Even then this may be cheap talk and not
reflect Viacom's actual reason for not bidding.
80. See David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 18-23 (1999)
(comparing a bidder's incentives in an auction without a right of first refusal with an auction in which another
bidder holds a right of first refusal).
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Careful readers here will note that all of this is phrased in probability, and that what
is really being said is that the actual effect of matching rights depends upon the individual
circumstances of the auction and bidding, and that, in either case, the effects may be
positive or negative. Of course, the theory of how matching rights should work may not
match reality.
While individual transactions and individual lock-ups, or indeed lock-ups working
together, may produce inefficient effects (or not), the bigger question in the case of lockup creep is whether this is an aggregate social welfare problem. In individual cases, it
may very well be that lock-up creep affects the course and outcome of bidding in a
positive or negative manner, but in the aggregate, lock-up creep may have no effect or a
positive effect because of similar issues as with matching rights-the individual situation
of the bidder and target and whether theory works in reality. Individually or collectively,
lock-ups may not affect the price of bidding, instead merely affecting the process used
rather than the value. Even if individual cases result in uneconomic outcomes, these do
not appear to be materially affecting the takeover market, at least not in an observable
manner. As in the matching rights case, this is all driven by the fact that lock-ups may
have positive, negative, or no effects depending upon the circumstances of the
transaction.
Nor can we make definitive empirical conclusions at this time about the effect of
lock-up-creep. It is difficult to isolate and identify individual lock-ups and their effect on
bidding. Instead, each lock-up is related to the transaction itself and lock-ups act together
to affect transaction bidding. The negotiated lock-ups also likely reflect the parties'
anticipation of future bidding interest in the target. In such a circumstance, if you regress
bidding competition on the presence of a lock-up, the results may simply reflect the
parties' view of future interest in the target, not the actual effect of the lock-up itself
Even assuming we could code for the 30 or more different types of lock-ups and their
varying formulations, it would still be difficult to ascertain whether one lock-up has more
influence than another because of this endogeneity problem.8 1 There is also an issue of
simultaneity. The initial bid price and lock-ups are negotiated simultaneously, so it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine how one influences the other.8 2
Even coding for a general lock-up creep index would likely not address these
problems. This is particularly true because many transactions have identical lock-ups
with slight variation in the language, making differentiated coding difficult, if not
meaningless. Different types of lock-ups also impose differing costs and have different
effects. For example, termination fees impose a direct monetary cost, while information
rights do not impose direct costs but affect the behavior and ability of bidders to act
strategically in their bidding.
Because one cannot assess the wealth effects of lock-up creep without being able to

81. This is a gap in prior empirical research examining just termination fees or stock lock-ups. It does not
account for the myriad of other types of lock-ups. Nonetheless, termination fees may be the most costly type of
lock-up and so may predominate in their effects, thereby making them more susceptible to econometric
analysis.
82. In workman's language, this is because you can't set up a regression because you don't know which
variable to put on the left-hand-side-the bid premium or the lock-up variable.
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do more econometric analysis, the best we can say looking at descriptive data is that there
is no significant evidence to establish that lock-up creep is affecting the takeover market.
Moreover, depending upon the type of auction, the effect of lock-up creep is quite
distinct.83 Yet, there is no substantial differential in lock-ups among clearly differing
types of transactions. For example, the lock-ups in strategic deals that have private value
attributes and private equity ones that have common value attributes often are largely
similar. Because they do not appear to vary based on these transaction attributes, lockups, as negotiated in today's transactions, may not thus account for the idiosyncratic
nature of a takeover, boards instead applying them with blunt force. They are suspect.
IV. THE CAUSES OF LOCK-UP CREEP

A. Omnicare and the Delaware Court of Chancery
The rise of lock-up creep can ironically be traced to the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.84 In that controversial case, the
Delaware Supreme Court, by a divided 3-2 vote, held that the shareholder voting
agreements entered into by two directors who together controlled majority voting 1 ower
of the target were invalid under the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced scrutiny standard. The
focal point of the discord emanating from Omnicare was the court's requirement of an
"effective fiduciary out" when boards authorize lock-ups.86 The majority reasoned that
because mergers are ownership decisions requiring a shareholder vote, the court must
invalidate devices that absolutely lock up a merger before a shareholder vote.8 7
Prior to Omnicare, lock-up creep existed, but it was arguably focused on a few
confined and significant lock-ups. For example, Professors Thomas Bates and Michael
Lemon found that termination fees were uncommon in 1989.
They found that
approximately 2% of transactions included a termination fee payable by the target to the
acquirer.89 This had grown to over 60% of all deals by 1998. This trend continued, and
83. See Klemperer, supra note 58. at 170 (describing the effects of different auction designs on varying
auction formats).
84. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 929, 933 (Del. 2003).
85. Id. at 935, 939. In addition to the shareholder voting agreements, the merger agreement between the
target, NCS Healthcare, Inc., and the initial acquirer, Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. included a force-the-vote
provision. Id. at 925. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the combination of these devices effectively
resulted in an absolute lock-up. Id at 939.
86. Id. at 939.
87. Ornicare,818 A.2d at 939.
88. See Bates & Lemmon, supranote 66, at 470.
89. Id.
90. Id. ("The use of termination fees was a relatively uncommon practice in 1989, with approximately 2%
of all deals including target fee provisions. . . . By 1998, however, termination provisions were significantly
more prevalent with over 60% of all deals including target fee arrangements. . . ."); John C. Coates, IV &
Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307, 315
(2000) ("Lockup incidence has generally increased ... growing from 40% of all deals in 1988 to 80% of all
deals by 1998"); Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. EcoN. 431, 441
(2003) ("There is a marked increase over time in the number of deals in which the target agrees to pay a
termination fee to the bidder."). This finding has been attributed to undercounting in the Thomson/SDC
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by the time of Omnicare, almost every deal had a termination fee paid by the target.
The Omnicare decision incited significant fear among practitioners that the
application of an enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protections would lead Delaware
courts to regularly scrutinize and strike down lock-ups, countering the trend in
termination fee growth.91 Instead, the opposite occurred. Practitioners' fears were not
realized because of the way Delaware courts operate. The Delaware Court of Chancery,
the lower court, enjoys great latitude and decides the bulk of corporate law cases largely
without Delaware Supreme Court supervision. The Chancery Court judges vociferously
criticized the Omnicare decision. 92 Not only that, they immediately began to sharply cut
back the potential scope of Omnicare's holding. In Orman v. Cullman,94 the Chancery
Court held that a lock-up having a brief period of time before taking effect satisfied
Omnicare.95This approach would later be validated in more recent Delaware decisions.96
The Chancery Court continued to push back following Orman, not just on the
specific holding of Omnicare, but on lock-ups more generally. We should note that the
overwhelming majority of the cases discussed in this section are change of control
transactions subject to the enhanced Revlon duty to obtain the best price reasonably
available and not Unocal review.97 Despite this distinction, in examining the lock-ups in

Database. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 68, at 468-69.
91. David Marcus, Ruling on Openlane-YKAR Offers Guidance on Omnicare, DEAL MAGAZINE (Oct. 28,
2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/042397/commentary/ruling-on-openlane-kar-offersguidance-on-omnicare.php ("Lawyers immediately complained that the holding ignored the reality that a
company might be able to maximize its value only by committing itself irrevocably to a deal."). In the wake of
Omnicare, Professor John C. Coates, IV was quoted as saying, "[i]f you had taken a poll of M&A
practitioners--or academics for that matter-90 percent would have said the case would have come out the
(Nov.
1, 2003),
other way."
Edward Teach,
The Deal, Unlocked, CFO MAGAZINE
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfin/3010743/l/c_3046601.
92. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in
Which It Is Equitableto Take That Action: The Implicit Corollaryto the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus.
LAw. 877, 902-03 (2005) (describing hypothetical transactions in which a seller could use an absolute lock-up
to extract a higher price from a bidder and stating, "it is difficult to see why such an agreement would be
inequitable"); Transcript of Oral Argument at 127, Optima Int'l of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc., No. 3833-VCL
(Del. Ch. June 13, 2008) (then-Vice Chancellor Lamb stated, "it'sit's really not my place to note this, but
Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality").
93. Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS
Healthcare, 29 J.CORP. L. 569, 623 (2004) (recognizing courts' "hasty retreat" from Omnicare).
94. 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
95. Id. at *8.
96. For examples of the Court of Chancery's deferential approach to lock-ups, see Appendix B. This
symposium contained a vibrant discussion of the evolution of Delaware's post-Omnicare jurisprudence, see
generally Christopher M. Foulds, For Whom Should the Corporation Be Sold? Diversified Investors and
Efficient Breach in Omnicare v. NCS, 38 J. CORP. L. (2013); Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Specter of
Omnicare, 38 J. CORP. L. (2013); J. Travis Laster, Omnicare's Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. (2013); Brian JM
Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard,38 J. CORP. L. (2013); Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting
Omnicare: What Does Its Status 10 Years Later Still Tell Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. (2013); Norman E. Veasey, Ten
Years After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for DealProtectionDevices, 38 J. CORP. L. (2013).
97. As previously noted, the bulk of the cases summarized in Appendix B are also change of control
transactions subject to Revlon. Despite their differing applications in modem M&A jurisprudence, Revlon and
Unocal share common roots. That is, Revlon involved the application of the Unocal standard of review to a
board's reaction to a hostile bid. However, the "Delaware courts have extended these Revlon duties to
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these cases, the Chancery Court has tended to apply, or at least mention, the preclusion or
coercion elements of Unocal review. 98 We argue that the end-result of these cases has
been to liberalize review of lock-ups for all transactions.
The milestone case to do this was arguably In re Toys "R " Us Shareholders
Litigation.99 In that case, the well-respected, then-Vice Chancellor Strine ruled on the
following lock-up package: (1) a fixed termination fee of $247 million, equal to 3.75% of
equity value or 3.25% of enterprise value; (2) an agreement to pay up to $30 million in
documented expenses after a naked no vote; (3) a relatively non-restrictive no-shop
clause permitting the consideration of unsolicited bids; and (4) a temporally-limited
match right.100 This decision was unique in that it was one of the only Chancery Court
cases since Omnicare in which the court addressed expert testimony as to the use of lockups.lo0 Professor R. Preston McAfee, an economist at the California Institute of
Technology, testified that matching rights were stiff barriers to rival bidders.102 Harvard
Law School Professor Guhan Subramanian testified that termination fees, when
combined with matching rights, were potent obstacles to emerging bidders.103 Professor
Subramanian further asserted that any termination fee of 3% or more "has a reasonable

negotiated transactions." Sautter, PromisesMade to be Broken?, supranote 5, at 941.
98. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., Civil Action No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at
*17, *20 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (recognizing "[t]raditional Omnicare claims allege that deal-protection
devices impermissibly 'lock up' a transaction by being preclusive and/or coercive," and noting that the deal
protections were unreasonable in light of the lack of a pre-signing sales process, but denying the motion for a
preliminary injunction); In re BioClinica S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 8272VCG, 2013 WL 673736, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 25, 2013) (emphasis added) ("I must examine the effect of the deal-protection devices as they operate in
concert to determine whether they preclude other offers or coerce the votes of the stockholders."); In re
Answers Corp. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011)
(finding lock-ups were not preclusive); Louisiana Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172,
1181 n. 10 (Del. Ch. 2007) (referring to the preclusive or coercive nature of the lock-ups).
99. In re Toys "R" Us S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).
100. Id. at 997.
101. Compare id. at 1016 (discussing the reasonableness of the deal protections, including lock-ups, and
noting that "neither of the plaintiffs'plaintiffs' distinguished experts has said what he would have done had he
faced the choice that the Toys "R" Us board did"), with Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., Civil Action No.
8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *17, *20 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (analyzing deal protections without
addressing expert testimony as to the use of lock-ups); In re Plains Exploration & Production Co. S'holder
Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (analyzing deal protections without
addressing expert testimony as to the use of lock-ups); In re BioClinica S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 8272-VCG,
2013 WL 673736 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2013) (analyzing deal protections without addressing expert testimony as
to the use of lock-ups); In re Answers Corp. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780, at *1
n.4, *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (addressing expert testimony only to the valuation of a target company and not
to the use of lock-ups); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928
(Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (analyzing deal protections without addressing expert testimony as to the use of lockups); In re 3Com S'holders Litig., Civil Action No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009)
(analyzing deal protections without addressing expert testimony as to the use of lock-ups); Louisiana Mun.
Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1189 (Del. Ch. 2007) (addressing expert opinions on
an antitrust issue but not on the use of lock-ups).
102. In re Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1014-15.
103. Id.
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likelihood of foreclosing higher value bidders." 1 04
After describing the arguments of these experts, the court asserted that neither of the
experts had "said what he would have done had he faced the choice that the Toys "R" Us
board did."105 The court later stated:
It is this tradeoff-between getting the highest price the board could from KKR
Group right then and there, and the limited opportunity of receiving a higher
bid from a well-canvassed market by reducing the termination fee and
eliminating the match rights-which the board and its advisors had to address,
and which the plaintiffs and their ivory tower-based experts refuse to
realistically engage.106
The court held that neither termination fees nor matching rights were per se
invalid,107 and that there were numerous examples showing that the combination of these
two does "not deter a fervent bidder intent on paying a materially higher price for the
[c]ompany.,,1o The court concluded by acknowledging that this lock-up package could
preclude larger bids, but that, "it is not the concern of our law to set up a system that
promotes endless incremental bidding. To do so risks creating an incentive for lower
initial deal prices because buyers will have less closing certainty." In other words, the
Delaware courts were not about to adopt the U.K. system's per se prohibition on lockups.
Notably, the court also adopted what could be equated with a deferential standard
for review of lock-ups, stating:
Deal protections, of course, do provide a bidding cushion for merger partners
that makes small, margin-topping bids non-viable. When that cushion results,
as it did here, from a good faith negotiation process in which the target board
has reasonably granted these protections in order to obtain a good result for the
stockholders, there is no grounds for judicial intrusion. 109
Toys "R " Us marked a series of Delaware cases adopting this hands-off approach to
lock-ups.110 Moreover, although the Unocal-Unitrin standard inherently called for a
nuanced review of the record, Delaware courts since Omnicare have almost universally
condoned deal protection measures so long as it appears that the deal was not otherwise
"[]tainted by self-interest." 1 1 The Chancery Court's repeated reliance on what is

104. Id at 1015.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1017.
107. In re Toys "R" Us,877 A.2d at 1017.
108. Id. at 1019.
109. Id.at 1021.
110. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 4, at 1013 ("Although matching rights are subject to intermediate scrutiny
in practice, courts appear to apply only a cursory review of the use of matching rights as deal protections.").
111. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 (Del. Ch. 2011). In Del Monte, Vice
Chancellor Laster granted a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Del Monte shareholder vote for twenty
days after finding severe impropriety on the part of Del Monte's financial advisor, Barclays. Id. During this
twenty-day period, the parties to the merger agreement were also enjoined from enforcing the lock-ups in the
merger agreement, as the court found that these measures were secured as a part of a negotiation that was
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"customary" is documented on the chart set forth in Appendix A. The chart summarizes
each Chancery Court decision involving a challenge to lock-ups decided since Omnicare
through May 21, 2013 and is available on Westlaw. It reveals that, despite the expert
testimony in Toys "R " Us, the Delaware Court of Chancery has repeatedly upheld
termination fees within a 2% to 4% range.112 In fact, according to Factset Mergermetrics,
the average termination fee during the period from 2008 and 2012 was 3.52% of
transaction value and the median termination fee was 3.41% of transaction value. 113
Moreover, the Court of Chancery has repeatedly upheld matching rights periods of
between two and five business days. 114
The Chancery Court's deferential approach to lock-ups in the wake of Toys "R " Us
was illustrated two years later in Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement
System v. Crawford. 15 Relying on Toys "R " Us in its discussion, the court explained that
there was no bright line rule that dealmakers must follow in designing deal protection
devices.116 More specifically, the court enumerated factors it would consider when
examining termination fees, including:
the overall size of the termination fee, as well as its percentage value; the
benefit to shareholders, including a premium (if any) that directors seek to
protect; the absolute size of the transaction, as well as the relative size of the
partners to the merger; the degree to which a counterparty found such
protections to be crucial to the deal, bearing in mind differences in bargaining
power; and the preclusive or coercive power of all deal protections included in
a transaction, taken as a whole. 117
Once again, the court warned that dealmakers should not rely on a "3%rule," which,
although it may be "convenient ... it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to
abuse, for th[e] [c]ourt to bless as a blanket rule." 1 18 The court also cautioned that
dealmakers could not "rely upon some naturally-occurring rate or c9mbination of deal
protection measures, the existence of which will invoke the judicial blue pencil." 19
Instead, plaintiffs challenging deal protections would need to show how those deal
protections "operate in an unreasonable, preclusive, or coercive manner, under the
standards of this Court's Unocaljurisprudence, to inequitably harm shareholders."' 20
But while this rhetoric opens up some avenue for shareholders to challenge lock-

tainted by Barclays' conflict. Id. Those lock-ups included, among other things, a two-tier termination fee and a
three-business day matching right period. Id. Vice Chancellor Laster was quick to note, however, that "i]f
[these provisions had been] included in an arms' length deal untainted by self-interest, the defensive measures
would be quite reasonable." Id.
112. See Appendix B.
113. MERGERMETRICs DATABASE, supra note 25.
114. See Appendix B.
115. Louisiana Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id
119. Id.
120. Crawford,918 A.2d at 1181 n.10.
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ups, a review of the cases shows in reality that the Delaware Chancery Court has
repeatedly signed off on merger agreement lock-ups without significant scrutiny.121
Chancellor Strine's decision in Toys "R " Us arguably remains one of the only Court of
Chancery opinions in which the deal protection provisions were not automatically
approved as standard. In contrast to Toys "R" Us, the majority of the Chancery Court
decisions tend not to engage in a detailed analysis of the deal facts or otherwise cite to
expert testimony. Even when there is some modicum of scrutiny, it is not focused on the
full panoply of lock-ups but rather on the most significant ones with a particular focus on
the termination fee.
This lack of a detailed analysis may well be attributed to the
context in which most lock-up challenges are brought. Namely, the overwhelming
majority of these cases are brought on a motion for a preliminary injunction, and the
standard applied to obtain a preliminary injunction places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff at each step of the analysis.123 Thus, it is the plaintiff who must submit expert
testimony as to the preclusive or coercive nature of the lock-ups. With the dramatic
increase in takeover litigation in recent years, expecting plaintiffs to produce expert
testimony and evidence may be too much when most cases settle. This is particularly true
in light of the Delaware court's inherent skepticism of expert witness testimony, which
creates an obstacle against putting forth such testimony.124
The end-result is that most Chancery Court decisions generally note that lock-ups
are standard merger agreement provisions and emphasize that these devices are not er se
For
unreasonable to then find that the lock-ups in that instance are appropriate.
example, in In re Atheros Communications, Inc., the court upheld an agreement that
included a no shop, matching rights, and a termination fee that represented 3.3% of the
transaction value, stating that "Delaware courts have repeatedly recognized 'that
provisions such as these are standard merger terms, are not per se unreasonable, and do
not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty.,,,126 Similarly, in In re 3Com

121. See Appendix B (reviewing cases that analyzed merger agreement lock-ups and finding those cases
rarely used significant scrutiny).
122. One exception was in In re Compellent Techs. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 638252
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011), where the court engaged in an extended analysis of these lock-ups with the aid of
expert witnesses. But Compellent was a fee petition and did not encompass merit review (one of the authors,
Steven M. Davidoff, was an expert in the Compellent matter for the plaintiffs for purposes of the attorneys' fee
petition).
123. Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del.
1974). In the context of mergers and acquisitions, this burden on the plaintiff is in contrast to the principles
enumerated in the Omnicare and Unocal line of cases, placing the burden of strict scrutiny on a company's
board of directors. Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934 (Del. 2003).
124. See, e.g., United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., No. 3360-CC, 2007 WL 4465520, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 13, 2007) (allowing expert testimony regarding deal structures but prohibiting expert testimony
regarding "customs and practices of drafting in M & A negotiations"); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
No. 15452-NC, 2004 WL 550750, at * 1, (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2004) (granting motion to preclude expert testimony
relating to board's fiduciary duties).
125. In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 4, 2011); In re 3Com S'holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009).
126. Atheros, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (quoting 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7). The court reached a
similar conclusion in In re Answers Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2011 WL 1366780 (Del. Ch. Apr.
11, 2011). In that case, the court dedicated little time to the review of "a termination fee plus expense
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Shareholders Litigation, the shareholders alleged that the 3Com directors breached their
fiduciary duties by approving an agreement including a no shop, matching rights
provision, and a termination fee that, along with the reimbursement fee, represented over
4% of the equity value of the merger. The 3Com directors also allegedly failed "to make
an effort to solicit other buyers before entering the Merger agreement." 27 The Chancery
Court did not engage in a detailed analysis of the deal facts as they related to the deal
protection provisions nor detailed analysis of all of the lock-ups, instead stating:
[T]his Court has repeatedly held that provisions such as these are standard
merger terms, are not per se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches
of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs here fail to explain how these provisions would
prevent another bidder from making a competing offer in this case. Indeed,
plaintiffs ignore the notable absence of any other interested bidders.128
Despite the repeated recognition that lock-ups are not per se unreasonable, the
courts have recognized that lock-ups are ever-evolving.129 In a 2011 case, In re Orchid
Cellmark Inc. ShareholderLitigation, the court warned:
Deal protection measures evolve. Not surprisingly, we do not have a bright line
test to help us all understand when too much is recognized as too much.
Moreover, it is not merely a matter of measuring one deal protection device;
one must address the sum of all devices. Because of that, one of these days
some judge is going to say "no more" and, when the drafting lawyer looks
back, she will be challenged to figure out how or why the incremental
enhancement mattered. It will be yet another instance of the straw and the poor
camel's back. At some point, aggressive deal protection devices-amalgamated
as they are-run the risk of being deemed so burdensome and costly as to
render the "fiduciary out" illusory.
Notwithstanding that warning, the Orchid Cellmark court ultimately found that the line
had not been crossed in that case. 13 1 Orchid Cellmark highlights the Delaware Chancery
reimbursement of 4.4% of the [p]roposed [t]ransaction's equity value, a no solicitation clause, a 'no-talk'
provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss an alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder, a matching
rights provision, and a force-the-vote requirement," finding these provisions not to be preclusive. In re Answers
Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 n.47.
127. 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7.
128. Id.
129. In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *8 (Del. Ch. May
12,2011).
130. Id.
131. Id. In the beginning of 2012, the court relied on Orchid Cellmark not to invalidate a package of deal
protection devices but rather to find a similar package to be reasonable. In re Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 7197VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012). That case involved:
[A] tender offer at SI per share, followed by a second-step cash out merger ... [and included] (1)
a no-solicitation provision; (2) information and matching rights; (3) a termination fee [representing
3.4% of the overall equity value of the deal]; and (4) an amendment to Micromet's [r]ights
[a]greement exclude[ing] [the buyer from the target's] poison pill, but [leaving] the pill in place as
to all other potential bidders.
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Court's deferential approach to lock-ups, which at the same time is evolving to continue
this approach even with the advent of lock-up creep.
Our review of these cases thus leads us to conclude that by repeatedly stating that
lock-ups are not per se unreasonable and continually upholding lock-ups so long as they
are market terms, the Chancery Court has abandoned enhanced scrutiny analysis in favor
of a reasonableness analysis. Of course, one can argue this is circular. If reasonableness is
a market standard, then the market can change. And change it did as we have seen. In the
period during and after these decisions, we have seen the expansion of market creep. This
leads to the next question. We argue that changes in Delaware court doctrine allowed
lock-up creep, but this begs the question of whether the response is based on market
forces or due to other agency costs.
B. Market Forces Versus Agency Costs
The market story is an easy one. The relaxation of Delaware supervision allowed the
market to function effectively. In this regard, targets are best able to judge their
individual preferences. They can decide whether additional lock-ups will affect future
bidding and adjust those based upon their prior contacts with other bidders, how the
company has been shopped, and what lock-ups are appropriate. Bidders can negotiate
based upon their own assessment. This will result in optimal market lock-ups.
There is evidence to support this theory. Again anecdotally, deals where there may
be higher immediate bidding sometimes have more lock-ups (though sometimes they do
not).
In addition, the rise of the go-shop and its spread to outside private equity
transactions may be seen as a way to deal with lock-up creep, though if that is the case, it
begs the question of why they are used principally in private equity and not strategic
deals.133 The existence of these lock-ups did produce higher prices in the bidding for
3Par and Diedrich's Coffee.134 The counter-evidence to this explanation is that lock-up
creep has been relentless and uniform in almost all transactions, whether or not the buyer
is a private equity or strategic one, and whether or not a go-shop is present.
This market story also has a darker gloss. The opening up of space for enhanced

Id. at *4. In addressing the plaintiffs' argument that all of the lock-ups considered collectively were preclusive,
the court analogized the lock-ups in Micromet to those upheld in Orchid Cellmark and "further note[d] that In
re Orchid involved only a slightly longer post-signing period of forty-two days, six more days than the postsigning period in this case." Id at *9. The court then denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.
Id. at *14.
132. See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *21-22
(Del.Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (referring to a study finding that stronger lock-up provisions correlate with a lower
probability of topping bids). Then again, though, there does not appear any real consistent pattern in more
competitive bidding beyond perhaps termination fees. See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 68, at 483 (finding
that the use of termination fees is significantly and positively correlated with takeover competition).
133. See Christina M. Sautter, Shopping DuringExtended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops-The
Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 525, 554 (2008) (relating the increased use of go-shop provisions to the particular concerns
private equity firms have in acquisition negotiations); Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shop Provisions in Private
Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 730 (2008) (suggesting that go-shop provisions
provide a better alternative to traditional no-shop provisions in deal structuring).
134. Supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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lock-ups may have led management to impose their own costs. Management may have
pushed for these lock-ups in order to steer bids towards preferred bidders. In other words,
sell-side agency costs are driving lock-up creep. In this case, anecdotal evidence is harder
to find due to the uniformity of many types of lock-ups, but in examining transactions
and in discussions with practitioners, there does not appear to be much evidence of this
story.' 35
An alternative narrative involves agency costs on the buy-side. Freed of court
restrictions, buy-side lawyers, wanting to show value to their clients, negotiated more
intricate and novel lock-ups. Alternatively, it may be that lock-up creep is a function of
attorneys acting to protect their own interests. As one takeover attorney put it to us:
[I]n my experience, lock-up creep sometimes happens when a buyer was
burned (or almost burned) when a prior deal was topped or challenged. Or even
a particular law firm was burned in a situation. In their next deal, they put a
tweak (but sometimes a whole new idea) into the contract to address the
perceived gap that was taken advantage of. The lawyers on the other side of the
next deal either don't notice or don't care enough to make a huge deal out of
the new tweak (especially since the lawyer proposing it turns it into a life-ordeath issue either because he/she is enamored with his/her creativity or because
of a "fool me twice" mentality).136
There is other evidence for this story. The takeover market is a concentrated one
where a few law firms dominate. 137 These law firms regularly promote their new and
novel lock-up inventions in client memoranda. 138 Lock-up creep works to set a high
barrier to entry for competing law firms to enter into the takeover market, preserving the
concentrated nature of this business. 139 In addition, because lawyers tend to be formdriven and market-based, meaning that innovation quickly spreads, the fact of a creeping
market has been used to justify these lock-ups in all deals, further perpetuating lock-up
creep. When we asked one takeover attorney about this possible explanation, he agreed,
stating:
[O]nce one lawyer sneaks it into one deal (front door or back door), a lot of

135. It is also hard to conclude that management actually understands the scope and complexity of these
lock-ups given their intricacies and novelty. At best, to the extent this is an explanation, it is more a result of
management pushing knowledgeable attorneys in this direction. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationship between attorney agency costs and lock-up creep). See also Matthew D. Cain &
Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance? Management Buy-Outs and the Value of Corporate Process, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2011) (examining the role of lock-ups in management buy-outs and assessing their
agency costs).
136. Interview with M&A Partner at "top ten" takeover law firm.
137. Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in PrivateEquity Contractingand
Strategic Default (Sept. 11, 2012) (presented at AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1540000.
138. See, e.g., supranotes 50-52.
139. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach, 9.1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD.
92, 107 (2012) (noting that from a sample of 1,020 transactions, 54.2% of transactions in the sample had "one
or both parties represented by one of the top ten firms").
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pressure builds on lawyers to ask for the same in their next deal. "Isn't it
irresponsible not to get it for my client?" And as soon as there are a handful of
examples, the precedent-based argument becomes the downhill snowball. A
little bit of a twist on your argument of "precedent." 1 40
Professor John C. Coates, IV and Guhan Subramanian have called this the "Lake
Woebegone" effect in the context of the growth of termination fees. Every transactional
lawyer wants to meet or exceed the average.141 As we have already noted, the result has
been that the variance among deals while existent does not appear significant, and any
variance is often not based on the deal characteristics but rather the law firm negotiating
the transaction. 142
Why would targets allow this to occur? We offer two explanations. First, these
takeovers are all agreed transactions, and so targets are being paid their reservation price,
the minimum price at which they were willing to sell. Accordingly, targets and their
lawyers may not be concerned with bargaining significantly further to preserve the option
of a higher bid. Second, targets and their lawyers may have acquiesced under the
assumption that these lock-ups would not have meaning. In either case, it does not appear
that lock-up creep has been met with significant resistance from targets.
The evidence thus seems to point to there being a strong measure of lawyer agency
costs. The best evidence available is that lock-up creep does not appear to have affected
the market, except in certain anecdotal cases, pointing to an agency cost explanation. The
rapid spread and promotion of innovation in lock-ups and their trumpeting by law firms
appears to jibe with this explanation. In particular, the general but not granular uniformity
of lock-ups in transactions mitigates towards a lawyer agency story. The contrary
evidence-that lock-ups were a market response or a trade-off for other innovationsdoes not appear to be as strong.
V. THE

IMPLICATIONS OF LOCK-UP CREEP

Based on this evidence, what are Delaware courts to do? The current status quo can
be viewed as deferential review where Delaware courts regularly find lock-ups
acceptable absent egregious additional circumstances. This does not mean there is no
review. In 2011, 92.1% of transactions with a value greater than $100 million attracted a
shareholder class action lawsuit.14 3 Of all these transactions from 2006 through 2011,
71.6% of these lawsuits settled and 12.3% of all deals involved an amendment to the
acquisition agreement.144 In this litigation and the settlements which occur, there is a
measure of judicial review.

140. Interview with M&A Partner at "top ten" M&A Firm.
141. Coates & Subramanian, supranote 1, at 334 n.90. Coates, supra note 59, at 246.
142. Our conclusion about law firms is based on our observation of the takeover markets and regular
review of merger agreements. In some respects, these granular differences may ultimately be due to the forms
used by law firms and the merger of competing forms that occur in takeover negotiations.
143. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and
Litigation 35 (Jan. 31, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=l 984758.
144. Id.
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Yet, the factors driving the composition of settlements are not subject to ready
observation. It may very well be that these settlements are the result of attorneys on all
sides acting under the shadow of Delaware law and its judges. It may also be that these
settlements are merely a "tax" being paid to plaintiffs' attorneys without regard to the
actual merits. 145 While the evidence supports that there is some merit review occurring,
there is once again no definitive evidence.146
Regardless, under the current system of deferential judicial review, transactional
lawyers receive little monitoring of lock-ups from the courts and litigation. Even if
shareholder litigation does provide some form of monitoring through settlements, it does
not appear that these settlements encompass anything other than material modifications to
a handful of substantive lock-ups. They do not go into the "weeds" so to speak and
redraft the convoluted and intricate language in these agreements, nor do they address
most lock-ups. Instead, the settlements mainly adjust termination fees or perhaps go so
far as to restrict matching rights, but not much further. 147 The courts follow the lead of
the litigators, for the most part refusing to engage in a searching review of lock-ups either
in merit review or through approval of settlements. 48
The question then becomes whether the current status quo is appropriate and
whether Delaware courts should adjust their standard of review. The limited evidence
makes firm doctrinal or normative recommendations more difficult, though we believe
that the bulk of theoretical and empirical evidence, though not definitive, already pointed
to heightened scrutiny of lock-ups since their effect is variant depending upon individual
transactions. Because of the limited evidence of the effect of lock-up creep, this
phenomenon alone does not justify a return to strict scrutiny of lock-ups by the Delaware
courts. Nonetheless, we do believe that the Delaware courts should consider examining
more broadly the collective effect of all merger agreement lock-ups in their analysis. This
is particularly true in cases where competing bids emerge and lock-up creep has
anecdotally been shown to have the greatest effect. In these cases, a higher level of
scrutiny
would prevent undue litigation over lock-ups, while also providing salutary

145. John C. Coffee, Jr., M&A Litigation:More and More Dysfunctional, N.Y. LAW J. (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.newyorklawjoumal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202592906739&MALitigation More-andMore_
Dysfunctional.
146. See Randall Thomas & Robert Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and its
Application to Multi-JurisdictionalLitigation, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1753, 1817 (2012) (explaining that
"Delaware seems, in most cases, to be doing an excellent job balancing investor and management interests" and
not "manifest[ing] extreme hostility" towards shareholders in lock-up situations, although noting that "there are
many who doubt this claim both today and historically"); Cain & Davidoff, supra note ,143, at 21-23. See also
Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1053 (2013) (arguing that merger litigation is a market for claims preclusion "in which plaintiffs seek to sell and
defendants seek to buy an important element of transactional certainty").
147. Cain & Davidoff, supranote 143, at 17.
148. This approach may make perfect sense for Delaware courts who are already over-burdened with
merger litigation. They may not view the costs associated with such a review to be outweighed by the perceived
benefits. Again, one exception to this is the Chancery Court's review of the Compellent settlement, which made
extensive changes to the merger agreement lock-ups. See supra note 122.
149. In advocating for a higher level of scrutiny of lock-ups in a handful of cases, we are not necessarily
arguing for the Unocal/Unitrin standard as the Omnicare court adopted. Instead, we acknowledge, as the
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effects in the market place. It would also jibe with theories that posit the effects of these
lock-ups are situational and dependent upon the individual facts of the transaction.
Attorneys and market participants are highly responsive to Delaware decisionseven dicta. With heightened scrutiny in a limited number of cases, the Delaware courts
may push market practice back or at least check the growth of lock-up creep. This could
be beneficial in moderating the effects of lock-up creep to the extent it is attributable to
agency costs. Otherwise, there is a risk of ever-more continued and evolving lock-ups as
lawyers push these devices into more arcane areas.
The uncertain empirical premise of even our modest recommendation must still be
acknowledged. Accordingly, while we believe that our policy recommendation is
appropriate, we acknowledge that it is not fully supported by the evidence. Nonetheless,
we see lock-up creep as an arms race without end and view Delaware court action here as
ameliorating the race before it does begin to result in preclusive situations. Again, we are
aligning ourselves with prior authors who view lock-ups as situational and that enhanced
scrutiny is appropriate to determine whether they are used appropriately. 150
Our remedy is thus more hortatory than anything else. Calling for courts to bullypulpit parties to end what appears to be needless drafting. This is not an uncommon
approach in Delaware, and was ably documented by Professor Ed Rock in his article,
Saints andSinners.151 Professor Rock analyzed Delaware's opinions in management buyout transactions, finding that they had salutary effects by shaming future participants,
rather than through lawmaking itself.1 If nothing else, identifying the issue may result
in attorneys self-regulating and undertaking the weighing that courts would substitute for.
VI. CONCLUSION

The takeover market is a prestige one rather than a commodity business, where a
well-compensated, concentrated group of law firms dominate. In seeking to justify their
position, there is evidence that attorneys are extracting their own rents. Hence, lock-up
creep. While more study of the issue is necessary, it is more certain that an arms race has
erupted as lock-ups multiply and become ever more intricate and heterogeneous. While
lock-ups were already under suspicion based on the available theoretical and empirical
evidence, the further evidence pointing to attorneys rather than market forces leaves us to
conclude that Delaware should more broadly review lock-ups, particularly in situations
where there is competitive bidding. The scrutiny of the Delaware courts in these limited
number of cases is also likely to have salutary effects more generally in takeover

Delaware Court of Chancery stated in Ryan v. Lyondell, that "Unocal is but one formulation of enhanced
scrutiny that might be applied; it is not, however, the only test, nor is it necessarily appropriate in all
circumstances." Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *16 n.96 (Del. Ch. July
29, 2008), rev'd, Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
150. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 1, at 376 (arguing that lock-ups are influenced by buy-side
distortions and should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny); Quinn, supra note 4, at 1049 ("At the very least,
courts should subject matching rights to the same level of scrutiny as that applied to termination fees.").
151. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev.
1009, 1103 (1997).
152. Id.
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transactions, pushing lawyers to limit their use of lock-ups and slowing, if not halting or
reversing, lock-up creep. More succinctly, perhaps it is time to stop the madness.
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Appendix A
Excerpts from Oracle-Taleo Merger Agreement

Section 6.02. Stockholder Meeting; BoardRecommendation; Proxy Material.
(a) The Company shall establish a record date (which will be as promptly as
reasonably practicable following the date of this Agreement) for, duly call, give notice of,
convene and hold a meeting of its stockholders, which meeting the Company shall cause
to occur on the 30th calendar day (or, if such calendar day is not a Business Day, on the
first Business Day subsequent to such calendar day) immediately following the date of
mailing of the Proxy Statement (the "Stockholder Meeting"), for the purpose of obtaining
the Stockholder Approval, regardless of whether the Company Board determines at any
time that this Agreement is no longer advisable or recommends that the stockholders of
the Company reject it or any other Adverse Recommendation Change has occurred at any
time; provided, however, that (i) if the Company is unable to obtain a quorum of its
stockholders at such time, the Company may adjourn the Stockholder Meeting for no
more than five (5) Business Days if necessary in order to obtain a quorum of its
stockholders and the Company shall use its commercially reasonable efforts during such
five (5) Business Day period to obtain such a quorum as promptly as practicable, (ii) the
Company may adjourn or postpone the Stockholder Meeting to the extent (and only to the
extent) the Company reasonably determines that such adjournment or postponement is
required by Applicable Law and (iii) if the Company receives an Acquisition Proposal, or
the price or material terms of a previously received Acquisition Proposal are modified or
amended, in any such case during the five (5) Business Day period immediately prior to
the day of the Stockholder Meeting, the Company may delay the Stockholder Meeting
until the date that is the seventh (7th) Business Day after the date on which the
Stockholder Meeting would have been held but for such extension. Unless the Company
Board shall have effected an Adverse Recommendation Change in accordance with
Section 6.03, the Company Board shall make the Board Recommendation and use its
reasonable best efforts to obtain the Stockholder Approval, and the Company shall
otherwise comply with all Applicable Laws applicable to the Stockholder Meeting.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Company agrees that (x) its
obligations pursuant to this Section 6.02 shall not be affected by the commencement,
public proposal, public disclosure or communication to the Company or any other Person
of any Acquisition Proposal, and (y) the Company shall establish a record date for, call,
give notice of, convene and hold the Stockholder Meeting and the matters constituting the
Stockholder Approval shall be submitted to the Company's stockholders at the
Stockholder Meeting whether or not (A) an Adverse Recommendation Change shall have
occurred or (B) any Acquisition Proposal or Superior Proposal shall have been publicly
proposed or announced or otherwise submitted to the Company or any of its
Representatives. The Company agrees that it shall not submit to the vote of the
stockholders of the Company any Acquisition Proposal (whether or not a Superior
Proposal) prior to the vote of the Company's stockholders with respect to the Merger at
the Stockholder Meeting. The notice of such Stockholder Meeting shall state that a
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resolution to adopt this Agreement and a resolution to adjourn the Stockholder Meeting
will be considered at the Stockholder Meeting, and no other matters shall be considered
or voted upon at the Stockholder Meeting without Parent's prior written consent.
(b) Except to the extent expressly permitted by Section 6.03: (i) the Company Board
shall unanimously recommend that the Company's stockholders vote in favor of the
adoption of this Agreement (the "Board Recommendation") at the Stockholder Meeting;
(ii) the Proxy Statement shall include the Board Recommendation; and (iii) neither the
Company Board nor any committee thereof shall fail to make, withdraw, amend or
modify, or publicly propose to withhold, withdraw, amend or modify, in a manner
adverse to Parent or Merger Subsidiary, the Board Recommendation.
(c) As promptly as practicable after the date hereof, the Company and Parent shall
prepare jointly, and the Company shall file with the SEC, the preliminary Proxy
Statement (but in no event later than twenty (20) calendar days after the date of this
Agreement). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement to the contrary, (x) if
the Company does not receive comments from the SEC with respect to the preliminary
Proxy Statement, the Company shall file with the SEC the definitive Proxy Statement,
and shall use its reasonable best efforts to cause the mailing of the definitive Proxy
Statement to the stockholders of the Company, on or prior to the third Business Day after
the tenth calendar day immediately following the date of filing of the preliminary Proxy
Statement with the SEC, and (y) if the Company does receive comments from the SEC
with respect to the preliminary Proxy Statement, the Company shall file with the SEC the
definitive Proxy Statement, and shall use its reasonable best efforts to cause the mailing
of the definitive Proxy Statement to the stockholders of the Company, on or prior to the
fifth Business Day immediately following clearance by the SEC with respect to such
comments. The Company and Parent, as the case may be, shall furnish all information
concerning the Company or Parent as the other party hereto may reasonably request in
connection with the preparation and filing with the SEC of the Proxy Statement. Parent
and its counsel shall be given a reasonable opportunity to review and comment on the
Proxy Statement before such document (or any amendment or supplement thereto) is
filed with the SEC, and the Company shall include in such document any comments
reasonably proposed by Parent and its counsel. The Company shall (i) as promptly as
practicable after receipt thereof, provide Parent and its counsel with copies of any written
comments, and advise Parent and its counsel of any oral comments, with respect to the
Proxy Statement (or any amendment or supplement thereto) received from the SEC or its
staff, (ii) provide Parent and its counsel a reasonable opportunity to review the
Company's proposed response to such comments, (iii) include in the Company's written
response to such comments any comments reasonably proposed by Parent and its
counsel, (iv) not file or mail such document, or respond to the SEC, prior to receiving the
approval of Parent, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed, and
(v) provide Parent and its counsel a reasonable opportunity to participate in any
discussions or meetings with the SEC. If, at any time prior to the Stockholder Meeting,
any information relating to the Company, Parent or any of their respective Affiliates,
officers or directors should be discovered by the Company or Parent which should be set
forth in an amendment or supplement to the Proxy Statement, so that the Proxy Statement
shall not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
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required to be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements therein, in light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, the party that discovers
such information shall promptly notify the other parties hereto, and an appropriate
amendment or supplement describing such information shall be filed with the SEC and,
to the extent required by Applicable Law, disseminated to the stockholders of the
Company.
Section 6.03. No Solicitation.

(a) Neither the Company nor any of its Subsidiaries shall, nor shall the Company or
any of its Subsidiaries authorize or permit any of its or their Representatives to, and the
Company shall instruct, and cause each applicable Subsidiary to instruct, each such
Representative not to, directly or indirectly, solicit, initiate or knowingly take any action
to facilitate or encourage the submission of any Acquisition Proposal or the making of
any inquiry, offer or proposal that would reasonably be expected to lead to any
Acquisition Proposal, or, subject to Section 6.03(b), (i) conduct or engage in any
discussions or negotiations with, disclose any non-public information relating to the
Company or any of its Subsidiaries to, afford access to the business, properties, assets,
books or records of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries to or otherwise cooperate in
any way, or knowingly assist, participate in, facilitate or encourage any effort by, any
Third Party that is seeking to make, or has made, any Acquisition Proposal, (ii) (A)
amend or grant any waiver or release under any standstill or similar agreement with
respect to any class of equity securities of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries or (B)
approve any transaction under, or any Third Party becoming an "interested stockholder"
under, Section 203 of Delaware Law, (iii) enter into any agreement in principle, letter of
intent, term sheet, acquisition agreement, merger agreement, option agreement, joint
venture agreement, partnership agreement or other Contract relating to any Acquisition
Proposal or enter into any agreement or agreement in principle requiring the Company to
abandon, terminate or fail to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby or breach
its obligations hereunder, or (iv) resolve, propose or agree to do any of the foregoing.
Without limiting the foregoing, it is understood that any violation of the foregoing
restrictions by any Subsidiary of the Company or Representatives of the Company or any
of its Subsidiaries shall be deemed to be a breach of this Section 6.03 by the Company.
The Company shall, and shall cause its Subsidiaries and its and their respective
Representatives to cease immediately and cause to be terminated, and shall not authorize
or knowingly permit any of its or their Representatives to continue, any and all existing
activities, discussions or negotiations, if any, with any Third Party conducted prior to the
date hereof with respect to any Acquisition Proposal and shall use its reasonable best
efforts to cause any such Third Party (or its agents or advisors) in possession of nonpublic information in respect of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries that was
furnished by or on behalf of the Company and its Subsidiaries to return or destroy (and
confirm destruction of) all such information.
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of Section 6.03(a) or anything else to
the contrary set forth in this Agreement, prior to the Stockholder Approval, the Company
Board, directly or indirectly through any Representative, may (i) engage in negotiations
or discussions with any Third Party that has made (and not withdrawn) a bona fide
unsolicited Acquisition Proposal in writing after the date of this Agreement, that did not
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result from a breach of this Section 6.03, and that the Company Board believes in good
faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel and Qatalyst Partners LP (or
another financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation), constitutes or is reasonably
likely to lead to a Superior Proposal, and (ii) thereafter furnish to such Third Party nonpublic information relating to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries pursuant to an
executed confidentiality agreement with terms no less favorable to the Company than
those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement and containing additional provisions
that expressly permit the Company to comply with the terms of this Section 6.03 (a copy
of which confidentiality agreement shall be promptly and in any event with 24 hours
provided for informational purposes only to Parent), but in each case under the preceding
clauses (i) and (ii), only if the Company Board determines in good faith, after
consultation with outside legal counsel to the Company Board, that the failure to take
such action would be a breach of its fiduciary duties to the stockholders of the Company
under Applicable Law.
(c) The Company Board shall not take any of the actions referred to in clauses (i) or
(ii) of Section 6.03(b) unless the Company shall have notified Parent in writing at least
twenty-four (24) hours before taking such action that it intends to take such action (it
being understood that: (i) the Company shall only be required to provide the notice
required by this sentence to Parent on one occasion with respect to any particular Third
Party; and (ii) this parenthetical shall have no impact on the notification and other
obligations of the Company contained in the remainder of this Section 6.03(c)). The
Company shall notify Parent promptly (but in no event later than 24 hours) after it
obtains knowledge of the receipt by the Company (or any of its Representatives) of any
Acquisition Proposal, any inquiry, offer or proposal that would reasonably be expected to
lead to an Acquisition Proposal, or any request for non-public information relating to the
Company or any of its Subsidiaries or for access to the business, properties, assets, books
or records of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries by any Third Party, in either case in
connection with any Acquisition Proposal or inquiry, offer or proposal that would
reasonably be expected to lead to an Acquisition Proposal. In such notice, the Company
shall identify the Third Party making, and the terms and conditions of, any such
Acquisition Proposal, inquiry, offer, proposal or request. Commencing upon the
provision of any notice referred to above, the Company shall (A) keep Parent reasonably
informed, on a prompt basis, of the status and material terms of any such Acquisition
Proposal, inquiry, offer, proposal or request, including any material amendments or
proposed amendments as to price and other material terms of any such Acquisition
Proposal, inquiry, offer, proposal or request, and (B) promptly upon receipt or delivery of
any of the following, provide Parent (or its outside counsel) with copies of all material
documents and material written or electronic communications relating to any such
Acquisition Proposal (including the financing thereof), inquiry, offer, proposal or request
exchanged between the Company, its Subsidiaries or any of their respective officers,
directors, employees or Representatives, on the one hand, and the Person making an
Acquisition Proposal, inquiry, offer, proposal or request (or any of such Person's
Affiliates, or their respective officers, directors, employees, or Representatives), on the
other hand. The Company shall promptly provide Parent with any non-public information
concerning the business, present or future performance, financial condition or results of
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operations of the Company (or any of its Subsidiaries), provided to any Third Party that
was not previously provided to Parent. The Company shall provide Parent with at least 48
hours' prior notice (or any lesser period of advance notice provided to the members of the
Company Board generally) of any meeting of the Company Board at which the Company
Board is reasonably expected to consider any Acquisition Proposal.
(d) Neither the Company Board nor any committee thereof shall (i) fail to make,
withdraw, amend or modify, or publicly propose to withhold, withdraw, amend or
modify, in a manner adverse to Parent or Merger Subsidiary, the Board
Recommendation, (ii) approve, endorse, adopt or recommend, or publicly propose to
approve, endorse, adopt or recommend, any Acquisition Proposal or Superior Proposal,
(iii) fail to recommend against acceptance of any tender offer or exchange offer for the
Company Common Stock within ten (10) Business Days after the commencement of such
offer, (iv) make any public statement inconsistent with the Board Recommendation or (v)
resolve or agree to take any of the foregoing actions (any of the foregoing, an "Adverse
Recommendation Change").
(e) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this Agreement, at any time
prior to receipt of the Stockholder Approval, the Company Board, following receipt of
and on account of a Superior Proposal, may (i) make an Adverse Recommendation
Change, or (ii) terminate this Agreement to enter into a definitive agreement with respect
to such Superior Proposal in accordance with the terms of Section 8.01(d)(i), but only if,
in either case, the Company Board determines in good faith, after consultation with
outside legal counsel to the Company Board, that the failure to take such action would be
a breach of its fiduciary duties under Applicable Law; provided, however, that the
Company Board shall not make an Adverse Recommendation Change or terminate this
Agreement in accordance with the terms of Section 8.01(d)(i), unless (A) the Company
promptly notifies Parent (the "Adverse Recommendation Change Notice"), in writing at
least three (3) Business Days before making an Adverse Recommendation Change or
terminating this Agreement (the "Notice Period"), of its intention to take such action with
respect to a Superior Proposal, (B) the Company attaches to such notice the most current
version of the proposed agreement or a detailed summary of all material terms of any
such Superior Proposal (which version or summary shall be updated on a prompt basis)
and the identity of the Third Party making the Superior Proposal, (C) the Company shall,
and shall cause its financial and legal advisors to, during the Notice Period, negotiate
with Parent in good faith to make such adjustments in the terms and conditions of this
Agreement so that such Acquisition Proposal ceases to constitute a Superior Proposal, if
Parent, in its discretion, proposes to make such adjustments (it being understood and
agreed (x) that in the event that, after commencement of the Notice Period, there is any
material revision to the terms of a Superior Proposal, including, any revision in price, the
Notice Period shall be extended, if applicable, to the extent necessary to ensure that at
least three (3) Business Days remains in the Notice Period subsequent to the time the
Company notifies Parent of any such material revision and (y) that there may be multiple
extensions of the Notice Period); and (D) Parent does not make, within the Notice Period,
a binding offer capable of acceptance by the Company that is determined by the
Company Board in good faith, after consulting with its outside counsel and Qatalyst
Partners LP (or another financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation), to be at
least as favorable to the stockholders of the Company as such Superior Proposal.
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(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6.03(d), the Company Board may, in
response to a material fact, event, change, development or set of circumstances (other
than an Acquisition Proposal occurring or arising after the date of this Agreement) that
was not known to the Company Board nor reasonably foreseeable by the Company Board
as of or prior to the date of this Agreement (and not relating in any way to any
Acquisition Proposal) (such material fact, event, change, development or set of
circumstances, an "Intervening Event"), fail to make, withdraw or modify, in a manner
adverse to Parent or Merger Subsidiary, the Board Recommendation (which shall be
deemed to be an "Adverse Recommendation Change") if the Company Board determines
in good faith, after consultation with outside legal counsel to the Company Board, that, in
light of such Intervening Event, the failure of the Company Board to effect such an
Adverse Recommendation Change would be a breach of its fiduciary duties under
Applicable Law; provided that no fact, event, change, development or set of
circumstances shall constitute an Intervening Event if such fact, event, change,
development or set of circumstances resulted from or arose out of the announcement,
pendency or consummation of the Merger; and, provided, further, that the Company
Board shall not be entitled to exercise its right to make an Adverse Recommendation
Change pursuant to this clause (f) unless the Company Board has (A) provided to Parent
at least four (4) Business Days' prior written notice advising Parent that the Company
Board intends to take such action and specifying the facts underlying the Company
Board's determination that an Intervening Event has occurred, and the reasons for the
Adverse Recommendation Change, in reasonable detail, and (B) during such four (4)
Business Day period, if requested by Parent, engaged in good faith negotiations with
Parent to amend this Agreement in such a manner that obviates the need for an Adverse
Recommendation Change as a result of the Intervening Event.
(g) Nothing contained in this Section 6.03 shall prevent the Company Board from
complying with Rule 14d-9 and Rule 14e-2(a) under the Exchange Act with regard to an
Acquisition Proposal; provided that any such disclosure (other than a "stop, look and
listen" communication or similar communication of the type contemplated by Section
14d-9(f) under the Exchange Act) shall be deemed to be a Adverse Recommendation
Change unless the Company Board expressly publicly reaffirms its Board
Recommendation (x) in such communication or (y) within two (2) Business Days after
requested to do so by Parent.
"Acquisition Proposal" means any offer, proposal or indication of interest from any
Third Party relating to any transaction or series of related transactions involving (i) any
acquisition or purchase by any Person, directly or indirectly, of 15% or more of any class
of outstanding voting or equity securities of the Company, or any tender offer (including
a self-tender) or exchange offer that, if consummated, would result in any Person
beneficially owning 15% or more of any class of outstanding voting or equity securities
of the Company, (ii) any acquisition or purchase by any Person, directly or indirectly, of
a majority of any class of outstanding voting or equity securities of one or more
Subsidiaries of the Company the business of which constitutes 15% or more of the
consolidated revenues, net income or assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries (for or
as of, as applicable, the twelve (12) month period ended on the last day of the Company's
last fiscal year), (iii) any merger, amalgamation, consolidation, share exchange, business
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combination, joint venture or other similar transaction involving the Company or any of
its Subsidiaries, the business of which constitutes 15% or more of the consolidated net
revenues, net income or assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries (for or as of, as
applicable, the twelve (12) month period ended on the last day of the Company's last
fiscal year), (iv) any sale, lease, exchange, transfer, license (other than licenses in the
ordinary course of business), acquisition or disposition of 15% or more of the
consolidated assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries (measured by the lesser of book
or fair market value thereof as of the last day of the Company's last fiscal year) or (v) any
liquidation, dissolution, recapitalization, extraordinary dividend or other significant
corporate reorganization of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries, the business of which
constitutes 15% or more of the consolidated net revenues, net income or assets of the
Company and its Subsidiaries (for or as of, as applicable, the twelve (12) month period
ended on the last day of the Company's last fiscal year).
"Superior Proposal" means any binding bona fide, unsolicited, written Acquisition
Proposal capable of acceptance by the Company which did not result from a breach of
Section 6.03 of this Agreement, made by a Third Party, which, if consummated, would
result in such Third Party (or in the case of a direct merger between such Third Party or
any Subsidiary of such Third Party and the Company, the stockholders of such Third
Party) owning, directly or indirectly, all of the outstanding shares of Company Common
Stock, or all or substantially all of the consolidated assets of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, and which Acquisition Proposal the Company Board determines in good
faith, after considering the advice of its outside legal counsel and Qatalyst Partners LP(or
another financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation), and after taking into
account all of the terms and conditions of such Acquisition Proposal (including any
termination or break-up fees, expense reimbursement provisions and any conditions,
potential time delays or other impediments to consummation), and after taking into
account all financial, legal, regulatory, and other aspects of such Acquisition Proposal
(including the financing terms and the ability of such Third Party to finance such
Acquisition Proposal), is more favorable to the Company's stockholders (other than
Parent and its Affiliates) than as provided hereunder (including any changes to the terms
of this Agreement proposed by Parent in a binding offer capable of acceptance by the
Company in response to such Superior Proposal pursuant to and in accordance with
Section 6.03 or otherwise).
Excerpts from Yahoo-Geocities Merger Agreement
5.2 MEETING OF GEOCITIESSTOCKHOLDERS.
(a) Promptly after the date hereof, GeoCities will take all action necessary in
accordance with the Delaware Law and its Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws to
convene the GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting to be held as promptly as practicable after
the declaration of effectiveness of
the Registration Statement, for the purpose of voting upon this Agreement and
the Merger. GeoCities will use its commercially reasonable efforts to solicit
from its stockholders proxies in favor of the adoption and approval of this
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Agreement and the approval of the Merger and will take all other action
necessary or advisable to secure the vote or consent of its stockholders required
by the rules of the NASD or Delaware Law to obtain such approvals.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement,
GeoCities may adjourn or postpone GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting to the
extent necessary to ensure that any necessary supplement or amendment to the
Prospectus/Proxy Statement is provided to GeoCities' stockholders in advance
of a vote on the Merger and this Agreement or, if as of the time for which
GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting is originally scheduled (as set forth in the
Prospectus/Proxy Statement) there are insufficient shares of GeoCities
Common Stock represented (either in person or by proxy) to constitute a
quorum necessary to conduct the business of the GeoCities' Stockholders'
Meeting. GeoCities shall ensure that the GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting is
called, noticed, convened, held and conducted, and subject to Section 5.2(c)
that all proxies solicited by the GeoCities in connection with the GeoCities
Stockholders' Meeting are solicited, in compliance with the Delaware Law, its
Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws, the rules of the NASD and all other
applicable legal requirements. GeoCities' obligation to call, give notice of,
convene and hold the GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting in accordance with this
Section 5.2(a) shall not be limited to or otherwise affected by the
commencement, disclosure, announcement or submission to GeoCities of any
Acquisition Proposal, or by any withdrawal, amendment or modification of the
recommendation of the Board of Directors of GeoCities with respect to the
Merger.
(b) Subject to Section 5.2(c): (i) the Board of Directors of GeoCities shall
recommend that GeoCities' stockholders vote in favor of and adopt and
approve this Agreement and the Merger at the GeoCities Stockholders'
Meeting; (ii) the Prospectus/Proxy Statement shall include a statement to the
effect that the Board of Directors of the GeoCities has recommended that
GeoCities' stockholders vote in favor of and adopt and approve this Agreement
and the Merger at the GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting; and (iii) neither the
Board of Directors of GeoCities nor any committee thereof shall withdraw,
amend or modify, or propose or resolve to withdraw, amend or modify in a
manner adverse to Yahoo!, the recommendation of the Board of Directors of
GeoCities that GeoCities' stockholders vote in favor of and adopt and approve
this Agreement and the Merger.
(c) Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Board of Directors of GeoCities
from withholding, withdrawing, amending or modifying its recommendation in
favor of the Merger if (i) a Superior Offer (as defined below), or an offer
reasonably believed by the Board of Directors of GeoCities to be a Superior
Offer, is made to the GeoCities and is not withdrawn, (ii) neither GeoCities nor
any of its representatives shall have violated any of the restrictions set forth in
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Section 5.4, and (iii) the Board of Directors of GeoCities or any committee
thereof concludes in good faith, after consultation with its outside counsel, that,
in light of such Superior Offer, the withholding, withdrawal, amendment or
modification of such recommendation is required in order for the Board of
Directors of GeoCities or any committee thereof to comply with its obligations
to GeoCities' stockholders under applicable law. Nothing contained in this
Section 5.2(c) shall limit GeoCities' obligation to hold and convene the
GeoCities Stockholders' Meeting (regardless of whether the recommendation
of the Board of Directors of the GeoCities shall have been withdrawn, amended
or modified). For purposes of this Agreement ("SUPERIOR OFFER") shall
mean an unsolicited, bona fide written offer made by a third party to
consummate any of the following transactions: (i) a merger, consolidation,
business combination, recapitalization, liquidation, dissolution or similar
transaction involving GeoCities pursuant to which the stockholders of
GeoCities immediately preceding such transaction hold less than 50% of the
equity interest in the surviving or resulting entity of such transaction; (ii) a sale
or other disposition by GeoCities of assets representing in excess of 50% of the
fair market value of GeoCities' business immediately prior to such sale, or (iii)
the acquisition by any person or group (including by way of a tender offer or an
exchange offer or issuance by GeoCities), directly or indirectly, of beneficial
ownership or a right to acquire beneficial ownership of shares representing in
excess of 50% of the voting power of the then outstanding shares of capital
stock of the GeoCities, on terms that the Board of Directors of GeoCities
determines, in its reasonable judgment, after consultation with its financial
advisor, to be more favorable, or is reasonably likely to be more favorable, to
GeoCities stockholders than the terms of the Merger; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that any such offer shall not be deemed to be a "Superior Offer" if
any financing required to consummate the transaction contemplated by such
offer is not committed and is not likely in the judgment of GeoCities' Board of
Directors to be obtained by such third party on a timely basis.
5.4 NO SOLICITA TION.
(a) From and after the date of this Agreement until the Effective Time or
termination of this Agreement pursuant to Article VII, GeoCities and its
subsidiaries will not, nor will they authorize or permit any of their respective
officers, directors, affiliates or employees or any investment banker, attorney or
other advisor or representative retained by any of them to, directly or indirectly,
(i) solicit, initiate, encourage or induce the making, submission or
announcement of any Acquisition Proposal (as hereinafter defined), (ii)
participate in any discussions or negotiations regarding, or furnish to any
person any non-public information with respect to, or take any other action to
facilitate any inquiries or the making of any proposal that constitutes or may
reasonably be expected to lead to, any Acquisition Proposal, (iii) engage in
discussions with any person with respect to any Acquisition Proposal, except as
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to the existence of these provisions, (iv) subject to Section 5.2(c), approve,
endorse or recommend any Acquisition Proposal or (v) enter into any letter of
intent or similar document or any contract, agreement or commitment
contemplating or otherwise relating to any Acquisition Transaction;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that prior to the approval of this Agreement by the
required GeoCities stockholder vote, this Section 5.4(a) shall not prohibit
GeoCities from furnishing nonpublic information regarding GeoCities and its
subsidiaries to, entering into a confidentiality agreement with or entering into
discussions with, any person or group in response to a Superior Offer submitted
by such person or group (and not withdrawn) if (1) neither GeoCities nor any
representative of GeoCities and its subsidiaries shall have violated any of the
restrictions set forth in this Section 5.4, (2) the Board of Directors of GeoCities
concludes in good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel, that
such action is required in order for the Board of Directors of GeoCities to
comply with its fiduciary obligations to GeoCities' stockholders under
applicable law, (3) prior to furnishing any such nonpublic information to, or
entering into discussions with, such person or group, GeoCities gives Yahoo!
written notice of the identity of such person or group and of GeoCities'
intention to furnish nonpublic information to, or enter into discussions with,
such person or group and the GeoCities receives from such person or group an
executed confidentiality agreement containing customary limitations on the use
and disclosure of all nonpublic written and oral information furnished to such
person or group by or on behalf of the GeoCities, and (4) contemporaneously
with furnishing any such nonpublic information to such person or group,
GeoCities furnishes such nonpublic information to Yahoo! (to the extent such
nonpublic information has not been previously furnished by the GeoCities to
Yahoo!). GeoCities and its subsidiaries will immediately cease any and all
existing activities, discussions or negotiations with any parties conducted
heretofore with respect to any Acquisition Proposal. Without limiting the
foregoing, it is understood that any violation of the restrictions set forth in the
preceding two sentences by any officer, director or employee of GeoCities or
any of its subsidiaries or any investment banker, attorney or other advisor or
representative of GeoCities or any of its subsidiaries shall be deemed to be a
breach of this Section 5.4 by GeoCities. In addition to the foregoing, the
GeoCities shall provide Yahoo! with at least two (2) business days or fortyeight (48) hours prior written notice of a meeting of GeoCities' Board of
Directors at which GeoCities' Board of Directors is reasonably expected to
recommend a Superior Offer to its stockholders and together with such notice a
copy of the documentation relating to such Superior Offer that exists at such
time.
For purposes of this Agreement, "ACQUISITION PROPOSAL" shall mean
any bona fide offer or proposal (other than an offer or proposal by Yahoo!)
relating to any Acquisition Transaction. For the purposes of this Agreement,
"ACQUISITION TRANSACTION" shall mean any transaction or series of
related transactions other than the transactions contemplated by this Agreement
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involving: (A) any acquisition or purchase from the GeoCities by any person or
"group" (as defined under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder) of more than a 15% interest in the total outstanding
voting securities of the GeoCities or any of its subsidiaries or any tender offer
or exchange offer that if consummated would result in any person or "group"
(as defined under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder) beneficially owning 15% or more of the total
outstanding voting securities of the GeoCities or any of its subsidiaries or any
merger, consolidation, business combination or similar transaction involving
the GeoCities pursuant to which the stockholders of the GeoCities immediately
preceding such transaction hold less than 85% of the equity interests in the
surviving or resulting entity of such transaction; (B) any sale, lease (other than
in the ordinary course of business), exchange, transfer, license (other than in
the ordinary course of business), acquisition or disposition of more than 50% of
the assets of the GeoCities; or (C) any liquidation or dissolution of the
GeoCities.
(b) In addition to the obligations of GeoCities set forth in paragraph
(a) of this Section 5.4, GeoCities as promptly as practicable shall advise
Yahoo! orally and in writing of any request for non-public information which
GeoCities reasonably believes would lead to an Acquisition Proposal or of any
Acquisition Proposal, or any inquiry with respect to or which GeoCities
reasonably should believe would lead to any Acquisition Proposal, the material
terms and conditions of such Acquisition Proposal (to the extent known), and
the identity of the person or group making any such request, Acquisition
Proposal or inquiry. GeoCities will keep Yahoo! informed in all material
respects of any material amendments or proposed amendments to any such
Acquisition Proposal.

Lock-Up Creep

2013]

725

Appendix B
Delaware Court of Chancery Rulings on Deal
Protection Devices Post-Omnicare
(As Found on Westlaw)
Case Name

Challenged Lock-Ups

Ruling

Orman v. Cullman, No.
Civ.A. 18039, 2004 V&
2348395 (Del. Ch. 2004).

Stockholders' voting agreement
required approval from Class A
stockholders (majority of the
minority); 18-month restrictive
period during which
stockholders party to voting
agreement agreed not to vote in
favor of another acquisition
proposal .

Motion for summary
judgment granted in
favor of defendants.

In re MONY Group Inc.,
S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d
9 (Del. Ch. 2004).

Termination fee representing
3.3% of equity value and 2.4%
of transaction value.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to correct
disclosure.

In re Toys 'R' Us., Inc.
S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d
975 (Del. Ch. 2005).

Three business days matching
rights; termination fee
representing 3.75% of equity
value or 3.25% of enterprise
value; up to $30 million expense
reimbursement after a naked no
vote.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.
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In re Topps Co. S'holders
Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del.
Ch. 2007).

40-day go shop; four business
days matching rights; 53
termination fee and expense
reimbursement of 3% of
transaction value during goshop and 4.6% of transaction
value after go-shop.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to correct
disclosure and release
third party from
standstill.

Louisiana Mun. Police
Employees' Ret. Sys. v.
Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172
(Del. Ch. 2007).

Five business days matching
rights; termination fee of more
than 3% of deal value,

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to correct
disclosure.

In re Lear Corp. S'holder
Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del.
C. 2007).

45-day go shop; if the acquirer
did not exercise its matching
right it was obligated to vote its
block of shares in favor of
superior offer; matching rights:
10 days but if the superior
proposal was in excess of $37
per share, the acquirer had a
single chance to match but if
superior proposal was not in
excess of $37, the acquirer had
three days to match successive
bids; termination fee and
expense reimbursement of
2.79% equity or 1.9% of
enterprise value during go-shop
and 3.52% of equity value or
2.4% enterprise value after goshop.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to correct
disclosure.

153. TOPPS Company, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(b)(ii) (March 6, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/812076/000095013607001390/0000950136-07available
at
001390.txt.
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Lyondell Chem. Co. v.
Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del.
2009).

Termination fee representing
approximately 3% of equity
valuel 54 and 2% of enterprise
value; three business days' 55
matching rights.

Reversed Court of
Chancery's denial of
defendant's motion for
summary judgment.

In re 3Com S'holders
Litig., Civil Action No.
5067-CC, 2009 WL
5173804 (Del. Ch. Dec.
18, 2009).

Termination fee representing
over 4% of equity value; five
business days1 56 matching
rights.

Motion to expedite
discovery denied.

In re Dollar Thrifty
S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d
573 (Del. Ch. 2010).

Termination fee representing
3.5% of deal value (or 3.9% of
deal value when taking into
account expense
reimbursement); two business
days matching rights.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

154. Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN 2008 WL 2923427, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 29,
2008).
155. Lyondell Chemical Co., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.2(b)(ii) (July 17, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/842635/000084263507000007/lyoexhibit2-1.htm.
156. 3Com Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §5.3(a)(i)(C) (Nov. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/738076/000095012309061809/b78042exv2wl.htm.
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In re Cogent, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d
487 (Del. Ch. 2010).

Termination fee representing
3% of equity value or 6.58% of
enterprise value; five business
days matching rights; top-up
provision allowing "3M to
purchase up to approximately
139 million shares, consisting of
all of Cogent's treasury stock
and authorized but unissued
stock, at the tender offer price of
$10.50 per share. 3M, at its
discretion could pay for any
stock purchased under this
provision either in cash or with
a promissory note due in one
year."

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

In re Del Monte Foods
Co. S'holders Litig., 25
A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).

First match: three business days;
subsequent matches: two
business days; 45-day go-shop;
if transacting with enumerated
"Excluded Party," termination
fee "representing 1.13% of total
deal value and 1.5% of equity
value" but if transacting with
non-Excluded Party, termination
fee "representing 2.26% of total
deal value [and] 3%of total
equity value."

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to delay
stockholder vote 20 days
in an attempt to obtain a
third party overbid. The
Vice Chancellor found
that the board likely
breached its fiduciary
duties as it was mislead
by a conflicted financial
advisor. The Vice
Chancellor compared
the delay "to a
disclosure-based
injunction" and
prevented the
enforcement of the deal
protection devices
during the delay.
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In re Atheros Commc'ns,
Inc., C.A. No. 6124VCN, 2011 WL 864928
(Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).

Five business days' 57 matching
rights; termination fee
representing 3.3% of "total
value of the Transaction."

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
granted to correct
disclosure.

In re Answers Corp.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
6170-VCN, 2011 WL
1366780 (Del. Ch. Apr.
11, 2011).

Three business daysi5 8 matching
rights; termination fee and
expense reimbursement of 4.4%
of equity value; force-the-vote
provision; two voting
agreements locking up
approximately 27% of the vote.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

In re Orchid Cellmark,
Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A.
No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL
1938253 (Del. Ch. May
12, 2011).

Four business days' matching
rights; termination fee of "less
than 3%of the deal price"; topup provision.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

In re Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp., S'holder
Litig., C.A. No. 6164VCP, 2011 WL 2028076
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2011),
revised (Del. Ch. May 24,
2011).

Three calendar days matching
rights; termination fee of
approximately 3.4% of equity
value.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

In re Micromet, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
7197-VCP, 2012 WL
681785 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29,
2010).

Four business days matching
rights; termination fee of 3.4%
of equity value and of enterprise
value; top-up provision; poison
pill.

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

157. Atheros Communications, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.02(b)(iii) (Jan. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 140486/000119312511001634/dex2 .htm.
158. Answers Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(d)(iii) (Feb. 7 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/dataI283073/000114036111006460/ex2_1 .htm.
159. Orchid Cellmark, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), §5.2(c) (April 6 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data107216/000119312511090300/dex2 .htm.
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In re OPENLANE, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
6849-VCN, 2011 WL
4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept.
30, 2011).

Termination fee if majority of
OPENLANE shareholders did
not consent to Agreement within
24 hours: 0%. Also, if the
agreement was validly
terminated, 0%.16o

Preliminary injunction
motion by plaintiffs
denied.

In re Synthes, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d
1022 (Del. Ch. 2012).

Force-the-vote provision;
matching rights of five business
days for a superior proposal and
two business days for an
amended superior proposal;
termination fee representing
"approximately 3.05% of the
equity value of the [m]erger" or
2.9% of enterprise value; voting
agreement locking up 37% of
the stock which would be
reduced to 33% of the stock
upon a change in the board's
merger recommendation.

Motion to dismiss by
defendants granted.

In re Novell, Inc. S'holder
Litig., C.A. No. 6032VCN, 2013 WL 322560
(Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013).

Five business days matching
rights; termination fee of 2.7%
of equity value

Motion to dismiss by
defendants granted.

In re BJ's Wholesale
Club, Inc. S'holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 6623-VCN,
2013 WL 396202 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 2013).

"[T]ermination fee representing
3.1% of the deal value"; forcethe-vote provision; matching
rights of three calendar days for
superior proposal and one
calendar day for superior
61
proposal revisions.

Motion to dismiss by
defendants granted.

160. OPENLANE, INC., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Sch. 14A), § 8.3 (Aug. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1438302/000114420411050194/v233512_prem 14a.htm
161. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.1(b)(iii) (June 29, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037461/000119312511176822/dex21.htm.
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In re BioClinica S'holder
Litig., C.A. No.
8272VCG, 2013 WL
673736 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25,
2013).

Termination fee representing
approximately 3.6% of equity
value' 62; matching rights of four
business days for superior offers
which could be extended by two
business days for superior offer
revisions1 63; poison pill; top-up
option.

Plaintiffs' motion to
expedite denied.

In re Plains Exploration &
Production Co. S'holder
Litig., C.A. No. 8090VCN, 2013 WL 1909124
(Del. Ch. May 9, 2013).

"Three percent termination fee,"
matching rights of four business
days and two business days for
revised offers.16

Motion for a preliminary
injunction denied.

Koehler v. NetSpend
Holdings Inc., Civil
Action No. 8373-VCG,
2013 WL 2181518 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 2013).

Termination fee "representing
3.9% of the deal value"; noshop provision; matching rights
of five business days and three
business days for revised
offers'65 ; don't ask, don't waive
standstills (which were
withdrawn after oral argument
in the case), and "voting
agreements ... lock[ing] up
approximately 40% of the stock

Motion for preliminary
injunction denied.

... [that] only terminate if the
Board terminates the . . . Merger

Agreement."

162. In re BIOCLINICA, INC. S'holder Litig., BioClinica Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions
for Expedited Proceedings, 2013 WL 663191 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2013).
163. BioClinica, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(c)(iii) (Jan. 30, 2013) available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/822418/000104746913000537/a2212643zex-2 1.htm.
164. Plains Exploration & Production Co., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 5.4(d) (Dec. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891456/000119312512493974/d449913dex21.htm.
165. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 6.3(d) (Feb. 19, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1496623/00011046591301181 1/al3-5550_1ex2dl.htm.
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